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ART. I.—*Academical Lectures on the Jewish Scriptures and Antiquities.* By JOHN GORHAM PALFREY, D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the University of Cambridge. Vol I. The last four Books of the Pentateuch. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1838. 8vo. pp. xx. and 512.

THIS is the work of a scholar of ripe years, who has brought to the difficult task of explaining the Old Testament, a keen, scrutinizing intellect, habits of careful and impartial observation, and an iron diligence. It is a work also on a subject on which English and American theological students have long needed a new work. The works on the same subject, which have been in common use among us, are of small value. Gray's Key to the Old Testament is too contemptible to be named among critical works. Every candid reader turns over its meagre pages, astonished at such condensation of weakness, stupidity, and superstition,—regretting that good paper should be perverted to such abuse.

The work of Mr. Horne* is of a different character,

* An Introduction to the critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures, by Thomas Hartwell Horne, M. A. Fourth American edition. [!] Philadelphia, 1831.

and has some merits. Indeed he must have a rare sagacity in avoiding truth, who could write four goodly octavos without impinging upon it. He who shoots all day, though never so awkwardly, must sometimes hit the mark. The plan of his work appears to be better and more complete than that of Dr. Palfrey.

Mr. Horne states many facts, which it is necessary a scholar should know; but, at the same time, he makes so many errors, or mistakes, that none but the thorough scholar can use his work without danger of being misled.

The work of Dr. Graves on the *Pentateuch* is written with force and beauty. It was a valuable work, (for the English,) in its day; but it is liable to the same objection with the preceding work.

The capital fault of these three works, and of all others in our language, which treat upon the same subject, is this. They set out with false principles. Their chart is not accurate; their needle does not point to the north. With one consent, they regard the Scriptures as a peculiar work, demanding a peculiar interpretation to explain it. Assuming the complete inspiration of the books, they can see no error in them. "They seek what they find, and find what they seek." But if it be admitted, at the outset, that every line of the Old Testament was originally dictated by the Most High to the writer, it does not appear why the same criticism may not apply to it as to other ancient writings. Words are but vehicles of thought, whether uttered by God or man; as words, therefore, they must be interpreted. The same criticism, then, is to be applied to the writings of Moses and Aristotle. The genuine is to be separated from the spurious; the true from the false; the reasonable from the fantastic and absurd.

Dr. Palfrey, we are happy to find, has abjured these false principles of his predecessors. He starts from a different point; governs his course by different laws. The Books of the Old Testament are before him; he professes to assume nothing more. He ex-

amines the works with the same impartial rigor he would exercise upon the writings of Hesiod or Hermias. If he concludes the books of Moses were written at the time alleged, it is because he sees what he esteems sufficient reason for that opinion. Does he credit the inspiration of a book or a passage, it is because he finds evidence which convinces him of the fact. This is his method; and though some may differ from his conclusions, or question their legitimacy, none can justly accuse him of begging the question at the outset, and revolving in the circle so well trodden by his predecessors.

He believes a revelation has been made to man in words, spoken in the Hebrew language. He sees no philosophical objections to such a belief. He considers the religious principle as the most important element in human nature; but at the same time so weak, that, unlike all the other principles, it cannot be trusted to shift for itself, to discover the truth and adhere to it.

He sees no objection to a miracle, when there is occasion for one; and he finds such an occasion, whenever a new religious truth is needed, and is to be disclosed by God. He supposes that all religious truth must be revealed directly and immediately from God, as man is incapable of discovering it for himself. Every such revelation must be authenticated by a miracle, for without this authenticating miracle man could not distinguish, — in matters of religion, — truth from falsehood. He defines a miracle, and makes its essence consist simply in its *extraordinariness*, that is, its *rareness*. Taking with him this standard, he justly concludes that miracles could not be continued, — as some maintain, — throughout the whole forty years of the Jew's pilgrimage in the wilderness, for they would cease to be rare, and by an easy process pass from miraculous to natural events.

Dr. Palfrey has at least done one service to biblical theology, by the work before us. He has laid down the principle, that in interpreting the Scriptures,

Truth should take precedence of Tradition, and that we should follow the dictates of the enlightened understanding, instead of the superstition of our fathers. In support of this assertion we refer to the following extracts. It has commonly been thought that the Jews were the only ancient nation blessed with a religion supernaturally revealed; but Dr. Palfrey says,

"I certainly would not venture to affirm * * * that the Jews were the only people of antiquity favored with a supernaturally revealed religion. Perhaps the most that with safety and modesty we could affirm upon the subject is this; that we have no sufficient evidence to show that any other nation has been so privileged. * * * *But this is not proof that he [God] never did make any other such revelation.*" — pp. 95, 96.

Some writers have fancied they were doing God service, by maintaining that the laws of Moses had no foundation in the existing customs of the Jews or the Egyptians. A great outcry was once made against Spencer, for attempting to show that the Egyptians and other nations observed similar laws before the time of Moses. But Dr. Palfrey makes some of his most important institutions grow out of the condition of the people, while in the desert.

"To whom does it not occur, that the direction to the males of the nation to assemble three times in every year had its first occasion in the necessity of preserving the integrity of the people, by preventing those who had the care of flocks and herds from wandering, in their excursions, to too great a distance from the camp." — p. 87.

Again, he says,

"They [the festivals] brought the citizens amicably together in a great national *Pic-nic*; they did, not ostensibly, but only therefore the more effectually, the excellent office of our modern invention of Cattle Shows and Fairs." — p. 457, note.

The book of Judges he considers "filled up with marvels." Yet his predecessors would fain have us believe them all as gospel truths; even as they are mistranslated in our common version.

Some have pronounced the Mosaic legislation per-

fect; suitable for the largest empire. Dr. Palfrey calls it "a minute, detailed, (shall I say technical?) discipline, *only capable of being administered in a small community.*" — p. 95.

Not only is every word of the law accounted inspired, by Horne and his coadjutors, but it is supposed to have a concealed spiritual meaning, quite independent of its literal sense.* Dr. Palfrey differs, heaven wide, from these English Talmudists,—who have nothing of Moses, but his veil and his "slow tongue,"—and recognises no meaning in a sentence which is not to be found out by the fair and common rules of interpretation. He has no mystical theories to develope, and therefore finds none in Moses. He is so far from believing that Moses was immediately inspired to write *all* the laws in these books, that he declares some of the most important regulations proceeded from Moses himself, or from his friends, and that others originated with him, and were, by a singular process, "submitted for the divine approval," and then announced, "as resting on the divine authority." — pp. 145, 146. The impartial student of ancient history knows well that the words, "The Lord spake," have the same meaning with "Be it enacted," prefixed to our statutes. Dr. Palfrey nowhere makes this assertion; but if, as he observes, the phrase, "He [God] buried him," [Moses,] means simply, "He was buried," why may not the analogous formula, "God said," mean simply, "It was said?" This construction is sometimes put upon it by the author himself. In one instance cited in this volume, (p. 146,) the same event is twice recorded; once it is said, "And *the Lord spake* unto Moses, saying, 'Send thou men that they may search the land of Canaan.'" But in Deuteronomy, where the same incident is related, it is written, "Ye came near unto me every one of you and said, '*We will send* men before us and they shall

* See numerous instances in *Horne* ubi supra. Vol. II., Part. II., ch. ii., and in many other places.

search out the land,' and the saying *pleased me well.*" From this and a similar case, the author deduces the following "principle of interpretation."

"When we read, 'The Lord said unto Moses, Establish and proclaim such or such a law,' *if that law appears to us trivial, * * we are not debarred from supposing that it had its origin in the imperfect wisdom of Moses*, and that he was but permitted to adopt it, in order that he might perceive its imperfections, and learn the political wisdom which his station demanded."—pp. 147, 148.

This is the most important principle in the book. It gives the reader liberty to measure the laws of Moses by his own mind. If the law is just, true, suitable, he will pronounce it divine; if absurd, he can refer it to "the imperfect wisdom of Moses."

The author departs from the common opinion in his views of the Sabbath. It is commonly fancied that the Sabbath was established by the Almighty at the creation; that it was observed by all the Patriarchs,—though from Adam to Moses, no notice of such observance appears,—and repeated to Moses, as a "perpetual ordinance," which has been changed for the Christian Sabbath. But Dr. Palfrey thinks the Sabbath was *first* instituted after the departure from Egypt, was designed as "a commemoration of the national deliverance from Egyptian servitude," and was celebrated by a simple cessation from labor. It is true, he adds, there was a particular sacrifice on that day; but this fact neither distinguished it from many other days, nor did it affect the individual's solemnization of the day." There was an holy convocation, that is, an assembly of such as were near at hand, to witness the sacrifice. Perhaps there were festive meetings of friends. Following Michaelis, he says,

"A Jew, who should sit perfectly unemployed, or even who should sleep, through the day, would have kept the Sabbath with a punctilious observance. 'In it thou shalt do no work,' says the command in the Decalogue; and this is the length and breadth of all which it enjoins."—p. 186.

The destruction of the first-born of the Egyptians, has usually been regarded as a signal miracle; so dreadful indeed, that it forced the tyrant to grant the prayer of Moses. The author considers the declaration, “‘All the first-born in the land of Egypt shall die; from the first-born of Pharaoh, that sitteth on his throne, even unto the first-born of the maid-servant that is behind the mill, and all the first-born of beasts,’ to be equivalent to this; ‘There shall be a remarkable mortality among the first-born of men and beasts.’” — pp. 133, 134. We are by no means informed, he adds, that the mortality was greater on this than on any other night, but “the intervention of a divinity was manifest in the extraordinary selection of the victims.” “‘But there was not an house,’ we are told, ‘where there was not one dead.’” “It remains to be asked,” he continues, “‘one’ *what* was dead in every house?”

Again, he opposes the the common opinion respecting manna, which is, that this food fell down miraculously from the sky, on six days, in each week, for forty years; and in such abundance that the Hebrews used no other food, except on certain specified occasions; that none fell on the Sabbath, while twice the usual quantity was provided on the preceding day. On the contrary, Dr. Palfrey contends that manna is a well known natural substance; as much “*fell*” on the Sabbath, with *one* exception, as on any other day; that it did not continue to fall throughout the forty years, and that it was never the only food of the nation. — pp. 143–159. He however recedes a little from this point.

“But after all it may have been necessary for the poorer portion of the people to be permanently provided for; and if so there could be *no more unexceptionable way* [*for God!*] of affording the supply, than by a constant supernaturally increased production of a natural product of the wilderness.” — p. 157, note.

Finally, to conclude this portion of our remarks, he denies that there was any miraculous agency con-

cerned in guiding the nation, by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night.

"When masses of men were moving through the vast plains of the East, we know that it was anciently the practice for their movements to be regulated by a fire near the leader's person, whose flame would be visible in the night-time, and its wreath of smoke by day, marking the spot where his tent was pitched when encamped, and the road which he was taking when on the march. It at least deserves careful consideration, whether the verse which I have quoted was intended to declare that the Lord went before the people in a flame and smoke, in any other sense, than that he was always in communication with their leader; he was always present in the smoke and flame, which, according to convenient and prevailing custom, were the artificial signal of the leader's presence. And this view appears to derive confirmation from the fact, that Hobab was subsequently engaged by Moses to be his guide, as one acquainted with the intricacies of the wilderness. If he had already supernatural conduct, there seems no reason why he should have sought such offices from Hobab." — p. 150.

And yet, with an alarming inconsistency, quite common in these pages, he attributes miraculous powers to this same fiery guide. For, on one occasion, he states it proved "to be a miraculous divine instrument;" again, "on the side turned towards the favored people, it was *all guiding and cheering radiance, while it rolled over the devoted heads of their enemies* its dense volumes of blinding and threatening smoke. *Such was its peculiar miraculous agency, on the present occasion.* But this," adds the author, "by no means proves it to have been, at other times, a supernatural phenomenon." — p. 151.

Sir Thomas Brown loved seven tests of his faith, even desiring a fourth person to be added to the Trinity, that he might believe the more; but we query whether even he, with his capacious faith, could believe there was no miracle in the general guidance of the fire-pillar, and yet affirm it wrought all these wonders on this occasion.

These instances show us very clearly the freedom

with which Dr. Palfrey explains the wonderful events recorded in the Pentateuch. Yet we can hardly believe that his explanations will be found satisfactory to the majority of readers. While he admits the abstract credibility of miracles, he seems desirous of restricting the miraculous agency to the smallest sphere possible. But when the *Deus ex Machinâ* is once fairly introduced, neither the frequency nor the marvellousness of his operations can produce any embarrassment. It is no relief to explain away ninety and nine miracles, while the hundredth is permitted to remain. If one camel may go through the needle's eye, all may.

Dr. Palfrey's explanations of the miracles, so far from being satisfactory, will in many minds create new doubts and embarrassments. If so much is mere natural occurrence, why call any portion a miracle? If so many of the events hitherto accounted miraculous can be explained away by the application of enlightened and searching criticism, why may not the few remaining ones be explained away by the application of the same criticism? Most readers, we are inclined to think, will wish the author had shown a broader and more obvious difference than he has, between the miracles he explains away, and those he retains, and also between those circumstances attending the same occurrences, which he ascribes to miraculous agency, and those which he concludes were but natural events. His decisions, in most cases, appear to us to be extremely arbitrary; at least he rarely adduces any solid reasons to justify them. He must expect then his readers in general either to stop this side of him, or to go beyond him.

We are free to confess that we do not find the difficulties, we have felt in regard to the wonderful events recorded in the Pentateuch, removed, or in the least diminished. The author does too much or not enough. He does not permit us to receive them as we have been taught to receive them from childhood, nor to find relief in regarding them as natural events,

which, through the long lapse of ages, men's ignorance, superstition, and natural love of the marvellous have greatly exaggerated. Does he not take quite too much liberty with the writings on which he comments, if they are to be regarded as the Holy Word of God; and quite too little if they are to be regarded merely as a collection of ancient traditions?—quite too much if there be any ground for supposing Moses their author; and quite too little if we may receive them as anonymous productions? Is it not easier to believe all the miracles recorded in them, precisely as they stand, than the few he retains, and as he explains them? And will not the impression of most of his readers be, that, had the author not adopted a theory he was desirous of maintaining, he would have admitted miraculous agency in them all, or in none? that his theory was to be sustained, and as it could not be by human aid, the introduction of supernatural agency became indispensable?

It will, however, be seen, from the instances we have adduced, that Theology is changing its ground among us; that it is abandoning some of its old positions, whether it be assuming new and tenable ground or not. It may not march as yet, but assuredly, we think, here is proof that it is preparing for a movement. The principles laid down in this volume, though the author may not always be faithful to them, are certainly far more consistent with reason than those of his English predecessors. None of them have ever dared advance such principles, or examine the Books of Moses with so free a spirit. Believing, as we do, that Theology, as a science, may in its nature be progressive, as well as the science of chemistry, or that of geology, we certainly rejoice at this, and without complaining of the author for what he has not done, we very cordially thank him for what he has done.

This volume comprises twenty Lectures or Chapters. The first sets forth the importance of the Inquiry. According to the common opinion of Christians, the

Jewish books contain the record of a revelation from God ; and although Christianity is more full and perfect, yet the first revelation is still of great value and importance, both on account of the truth it contains, and its historical interest. Besides the New Testament is connected with the Old, and modified by it.

Many objections urged against Christianity have proceeded from a misunderstanding of the Hebrew Scriptures. He thinks the language of the Jews was first fixed by Moses ; that his writings exerted an influence upon the Hebrew tongue, similar to that of Luther upon the German, and of King James's translators upon our own language. But if the Hebrew language were formed before the time of Moses, it presents a strange anomaly, — a nation of slaves forming a language totally unlike that of their masters. If it were formed by him, even during his life, we should find his language bearing the same resemblance to that of later writers, which the writings of Otfried and Chaucer bear to those of Goethe and Byron. Many of the learned of Europe date the Books of Moses in the high and palmy days of Hebrew literature.

One of the most valuable Lectures in the book is that on the Canon of the Old Testament. It seems scarcely to belong to the work. It is conceived in a different spirit. It displays more research than any four chapters beside. Fearless of consequences, the author follows Truth wherever she leads him. He states the common opinion upon this subject. That all the thirty-nine books of the Old Testament are of equal canonical authority ; that the Jews anciently esteemed them sacred, containing a peculiar revelation ; and that they were all collected into a single volume, at an early date, laid up in the temple at Jerusalem, distinguished from all other writings, and guarded with religious veneration. Some maintain that Ezra made this collection after his return from exile. But there is no authority for the fact ; and

it is certain a portion of the Old Testament was written after his time. Others ascribe this collection to the men of the Great Synagogue. "But such a body of men is unknown to authentic history." The conclusion of the author is,

"That there does not appear to have been any absolutely uniform Canon of the Old Testament, till three or four centuries, at least, after the New Testament revelation. If this be true, then it follows, not only that the uniformity was introduced at a period too late to admit of its being intelligently done, but still more, that, in giving this kind of definiteness to what earlier times had left indefinite, a contradiction was offered to the truth of history. If before, and at the time of our Savior, the Jews did not know, that precisely the books which compose their and our present received Canon possessed a peculiar and exclusive character of sacredness, then it could never become known to the Jews, for instance, of the fourth century; since it could only be through the channel of that earlier age, that the opinion, allowing that it was a correct one, could have come down to this later." — p. 23.

In the Old Testament we find works of the most opposite character united. Histories, mythical stories, the most beautiful hymns, amatory poems, proverbs, and predictions. How came such various works united in the same volume? When were they collected? By whom? On what principles was the collection made? Does it comprise all the relics of the Hebrew literature? Are all parts of it supernaturally inspired? If not, how is the divine to be distinguished from the human portion? All these questions connect themselves with this inquiry upon the Canon.

In ancient times a great diversity of opinion prevailed upon this subject. The Canon of the Samaritans added to the *Pentateuch* the book of Joshua. The Alexandrian version comprises not only all the books we include in the Old Testament, but the greater part of the *Apocrypha*.

Philo, contemporary with Jesus Christ, refers to

nineteen books of the Old Testament, though he mentions by name only two of the minor prophets.*

Josephus enumerates twenty-two sacred books. but we have no authority for believing they were just the same which we pronounce canonical, since Josephus says the last of them was written before the time of Artaxerxes Longimanus, who died 424 before Christ.

Among the early Christians there was no uniform canon, received by all. Origen, a great authority, does not enumerate the twelve minor prophets, though he repeatedly quotes them in his works. The author furnishes us with a list of the books contained in the canon of several of the Christian fathers.

We cannot forbear enlarging a little upon this topic. The books of the Old Testament seem to have been collected as relics of the national literature. Probably all the documents known were gathered together. The Jews of Egypt made additions to this collection. Some manuscripts contained more than others; no one, perhaps, contained all of our present Canon. These writings were well known to Jesus and his hearers. He and his disciples refer to them. Twenty-two books are thought to be directly quoted. This fact does not prove these books are canonical, or of divine authority, for Jesus also alludes to the Apocryphal writings.† Paul quotes the Greek poets; and Jude refers to the apocryphal book of Enoch.

* He makes no use of the Apocrypha, says Dr. de Wette, (*Einleitung*, § 17,) one of the profoundest of modern critics. Eichhorn (*Einleitung*, § 26) infers from his language, that he was acquainted with the Apocrypha, but did not hold it in so high esteem as the writings of Solon, Plato, and others, from which he made extracts in his own works. Jesus the son of Sirach mentions the sacred books of his nation, calling them "the Law, the Prophets, and the other Books of our Fathers." — *Prologue to the Wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach*.

† Compare particularly, John iv. 13, and Ecclesiasticus xxiv. 20.

xv. 1,	17.
i. 1,	9.
iv. 13, 14, and vi. 35,	21.
Matthew xi. 28,	19.

The fact that these writings are thus quoted is no proof of the inspiration or value of the writings themselves.

In the fourth or fifth century, for the first time, we find the Canon is definitely settled, in its present form. But by what authority? That of Time and Use. The Hebrew books were collected into one volume. This is the Hebrew Canon. Those found in the Hellenistic Dialect were likewise united. These form the Canon of the Alexandrian version. At this day, there is no Canon of Scripture, acknowledged by all sects of Christians. The Greek Church has always differed from the Latin. The Protestants adopt one Canon; the Catholics another.

"I find no way to avoid the opinion, that, as in the New Testament collection, so in the Old, the several books are to be judged on their several and independent grounds of evidence; and that, further, the mere circumstance of being excluded from the established Canon, and stigmatized by the title of Apocryphal, should not prevent other books from having their claims considered. I find nothing in history to simplify the labor of a critic on the Jewish scriptures, by satisfying him, that, by mere force of being found embraced in the now received collection, a book is to be acknowledged for an authoritative teacher of faith or practice. This is what, I conceive, he has first to ascertain, before he is justified to proceed upon it as a fact." — p. 42.

The next subject of importance, discussed in this volume, is the authenticity of the *Pentateuch*. Undue stress, we think, has been laid upon this question by the English and American theologians. Some writers seem to regard a doubt upon this point as one of the cardinal sins, and not like any other historic doubt. Dr. Palfrey defends the authenticity, but more feebly, we fear, than some of his predecessors. Since little has been written amongst us against the authenticity, and since the question is one of importance, we shall devote considerable space to an examination of both sides of the argument; only premising that the True is always the Best. The question is not connected

with Christian theology. No doctrine of morals, or religion depends upon it. It is an historical question, and is to be settled like all other historical questions.

The question at issue is simply this, did Moses write the four books, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy? Before the author puts the question, he makes certain necessary preliminary remarks. We are not to expect the same amount of evidence to support the authenticity of these works and that of the books of the New Testament. The former are very ancient; the latter comparatively modern. We must not expect allusions to Moses, in writers contemporary with, or immediately subsequent to him. No such writers existed; at least their works have not reached us. Again, all, he says, who maintain the later origin of these books, refer the principles of the laws to Moses, as their author. On the other hand, the defenders of the authenticity admit the existence of interpolations of a later age. Without this admission the authenticity cannot be defended. Some think the laws are from the hand of Moses, but the miracles are of a later date. Others defend the intimate connexion between the alleged miracles and the laws. He admits the Pentateuch cannot have had a supernatural origin, "*if immoralities are commanded, and erroneous and unworthy views of the Deity are presented*" in it. This admission is important, and deserves to be remembered.

If these books are authentic, they explain the existence of a pure theology among the Jews. Whence did they obtain the doctrine of the one true God, except from revelation? Admit the authenticity of these books, and the answer is plain; deny it, and the most perplexing problem is presented. The fact, that the Hebrew nation are found in possession of a pure theology, is only to be explained by supposing they received a supernatural revelation. This could only be authenticated by miracles. It is more reasonable to suppose these recorded are the "authenticating" miracles, than to suppose the record has been lost, and a false one substituted.

Again, if the books were not written in the time of Moses, when were they written? If Moses did not, who did write them? They were not written in the age of the Judges. The laws could not have been composed or adopted in such unsettled times. It was too near the age of Moses. The forgery would be detected. The work could not be written in the time of the Kings; for the laws are republican, and one passage is hostile to a royal government.* For the same reason it could not be written after the separation of the Kingdoms of Israel and Judah. Besides, the Israelites would not receive the law from their rivals, nor *vice versa*. Yet these books were revered by all the nation. "All the evidence * * * we have of its existence among the Israelites appears * * * so much proof of its having existed among them before the separation. * * * The possibility of such a theological system being devised at that period * * * will become more incredible." — p. 73.

Ezra read the law after the return from exile; its most rigorous command was obeyed. This shows the sense entertained of its authority. About one hundred and fifty years afterwards it was translated into Greek. The discrepancies between this version and the Hebrew original seem to show the work had long been in circulation, otherwise there would not be such different readings in various copies. This argument is enhanced by the Samaritan Pentateuch; which exhibits readings different from our Hebrew.

This is the external argument by which he attempts to defend the authenticity of the Books of Moses. But to give it more force he traces its several steps backwards. The work translated three hundred years before Christ, could not have been written between this time and that of Nehemiah, for he mentions the "Law," "the Law of God," and "the Book of Mo-

* Deuteronomy xvii. 14-20. But the whole passage favors monarchy, instead of "breathing a vehement jealousy" of it. Some writers think verses 16 and 17 were written after the time of Solomon. They apply to his conduct.

ses." Ezra, also, his contemporary, speaks of the "book of Moses," and of the "law of Moses, the man of God." The books of Chronicles, written about the same time, mention these books in the same terms, and recognise their existence in the reigns of Josiah, Amaziah, Joash, Jehosaphat, and David, who lived about five hundred years before Nehemiah. In the books of Kings it is spoken of in the same terms; and in the book of Joshua it is said to have been "Joshua's guide," about four hundred years earlier than the times of the kings.

Such then is the external argument in favor of the authenticity of the *Pentateuch*, traced forward and retraced backward. We have condensed the author's argument; but trust we have not misrepresented him. And to how much does this argument amount? Is it conclusive for the authenticity of the *Pentateuch*?

His arguments from the internal structure and character of the work are briefly as follows.

"The style of the *Pentateuch* agrees with the supposition of a remote age. The idioms of language and the rhetorical representations are of a simple character, while the tone and structure of the composition are such as we might expect from a man, engaged in an enterprise like that which he describes." "The work is written after the manner of a journal." "There are laws which breathe the desert air." Amongst these he places the laws relating to the feasts. "The anthropomorphic character of some representations, in it, of the divine Being," is "proof to us of the early origin of the book." "The remarkable chasm between the books of *Genesis* and *Exodus*," could only have been left by Moses. "The conclusion of the whole matter" is this.

"For the present I conclude with the remark, that, without urging the external evidence, with a confidence, such as has been professed in respect to it, but such as I think it will not justify, it yet appears to me, that *whatever there is, favors the commonly received opinion*: and that it is substantially, what we should be entitled to expect on the supposition of the cor-

rectness of this opinion, the actual circumstances hardly admitting, in any such case, of more. The internal evidence alleged against the authenticity I conceive to be based, for the most part, on mere misapprehensions, while that in its favor is of a very weighty kind and large amount." — pp. 89, 90.

The author does not profess to have done more than lay out the grounds of the argument, which he is to labor upon in the following chapters. But, alas, very little fruit of that labor appears in the sequel. Such is the argument; such the evidence from without and within, to support the assertion that these books were written by Moses, in their present form, some few interpolations only being excepted.

Is this argument satisfactory? Does it remove the objections; answer the questions which naturally arise? To us there are difficulties, attending a belief in the author's opinion, arising both from historical facts, and from the character of the work itself, difficulties which his argument by no means removes. It is not just to demand contemporary evidence to the authenticity of these books; but if Moses wrote them, by acknowledged divine authority; if he wrought all the miracles recorded in them; publicly enforced the observance of these remarkable laws in his life-time; if he enjoined their observance upon his successor and all the people, and, shortly before his death, commanded them to read these laws and histories to their children, — and all this is related in these books, and maintained by Dr. Palfrey, — then are we justified in demanding allusions to these laws and to the law-giver in the records of the times immediately subsequent to his age.

According to Dr. Palfrey, the earliest allusions to these laws are found in the book of Joshua, which treats of the times immediately after the death of Moses. He dates this book not far from the accession of Saul, or David, that is, about 1095 or 1055 before Christ, or five or six hundred years after the death of Moses. For our part we should rather date the book after the captivity, 588 before Christ. The

arguments for this date are as follows. In chapter x. 13, reference is made to the book of Jasher, which could not have been written before the death of Saul, since we learn from 2 Sam. i. 18, that David's lament upon that event was contained in it. The book of Joshua, therefore, could not have been written before the time of David. Again, chapter xi. 16, the Mountains of Israel and Judah are spoken of. This passage could not have been written before the separation of the two kingdoms. Finally, the mythology, the myths, the whole spirit of the book resemble that of the books of Chronicles, and seem to belong to an age when the Babylonians had exerted an influence upon the national character.* On account of its modernness, therefore, the book of Joshua can be of no value in determining the present question. If the book of the Law existed in its present form when the book of Joshua was written, it is natural for the author of the latter to refer to it. But such a reference would be a dubious evidence in favor of its early existence.

The book of Judges bears marks of greater antiquity than the preceding book. There is, perhaps, no reason to doubt that some of its narratives are nearly contemporary with the events they relate. The book may have been written before the age of David.† Here then is the earliest work after the time of Moses, but it does not mention him, nor allude to his institutions in the slightest manner. The history is minute; it deplores the idolatry of the land; but it mentions no sacrifice to the Lord, like that appointed by the law. It never speaks of a Levitical order of priests. Now, if the books of Moses were then in existence, is it not strange they are not alluded to? Would the

* See chap. v. 13–15. See De Wette, *Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Alte Testament*. Bd. I. § 147, et seq.

† It should be noticed that this book consists of two parts, first, i. – xvi., second, xvii. – xxi. This latter part bears marks of its recent composition. The day of the captivity is mentioned xviii. 30, which could not have been written before the time of Hezekiah.

most important precepts of the law be violated, and yet no notice be taken of the fact?

The books of Samuel contain the history of the following times. They were probably written soon after the separation of the kingdom.* They comprise an history of the nation from the time of Samuel to David. Moses and Aaron are both mentioned very naturally; but not a word is said of the law of Moses, or of the law-book. But allusions to customs in use among the Jews, similar to those enjoined in the books of Moses, occasionally occur. This is to be expected. But sometimes acts are done contrary to these laws. The ten plagues are mentioned, but are said to have been inflicted in the wilderness, and not in Egypt. The deliverance from the land of bondage is spoken of. Several passages in these two books resemble others in the Mosaic writings; but this is easily explained by reference to an unwritten tradition. It is besides highly probable that parts of the law were written before the composition of the whole.

Perhaps it is not just to infer the non-existence of the Pentateuch from the fact that it is not mentioned. But an event occurred which rendered it necessary to refer to the laws of Moses, if they were in existence. The laws provide for the election of a king; they even encourage it, and furnish directions for his government. In the time of Samuel the Hebrews desire a king of him. He is displeased with their request, and evidently considers it hostile to the spirit of their institutions. Had he been acquainted with the law in Deuteronomy,† would he not have granted their request without opposition? The most we can gather from these books, relative to the present question is, that some of the laws now in the Pentateuch were then in force; and that tradition had preserved a remembrance of the national bondage in Egypt, and of the delivery from it by Moses. All this is antecedently probable.

* See 1 Samuel, xxvii. 6.

† Deuteronomy, xvii. 14, et seq.

The books of the Kings were evidently written after the captivity.* In them we find allusions to the law. The law of Moses is mentioned for the first time in them. The dying David charges Solomon to keep the statutes, commandments, &c., "as it is written in the law of Moses." Now, since we know the law of Moses was acknowledged as the law of the land; at the time these books were reduced to their present form, it is more probable that the writer puts these words into the mouth of David, than that David ever uttered them. This consideration is strengthened by the fact, that we can find no trace of these laws during the reign of David, except this single passage written five or six hundred years after his death. But granting these words were uttered by David, the fact would only prove,—what may be admitted,—the existence of a written law of Moses, not that of the whole *Pentateuch* in its present form.

In the books of Kings, as in those of Samuel, an event occurs, which must have led to a mention of the book of the Law, if it had been an acknowledged authority. In Deuteronomy, especial directions are given for the preservation of the law-book, that is, the *Pentateuch*. "Take this book of the Law, and put it in the side of the ark of the covenant of the Lord your God, that it may be there for a witness against them."† A more suitable place could not be found; for the ark already contained the two stone tablets of the decalogue. If the law were revered as a divine authority, the book must have been in the ark. Now Solomon, at the dedication of the temple, solemnly transfers the ark to its new place in the Holy of Holies. "There was nothing in the ark," says the narrator, "save the two tables of stone, which Moses put there at Horeb."‡

In the long period from David to Josiah,—an interval of more than four hundred years,—we find the law of Moses mentioned but once, in the book of

* 2 Kings, xxv.

† Deut. xxxi. 26.

‡ 1 Kings, viii. 9.

Kings. There the "book of the Law" is spoken of, and a passage quoted from it.*

In the books of the Chronicles, — perhaps the most modern work in the Old Testament, — the law, and the law-book of Moses are oftener referred to, and a spirit more conformable to his institutions prevails. The Levites are in great power; they teach the people out of the law of the Lord. There is a feast at Jerusalem. Hezekiah offers immense sacrifices, and celebrates the Passover.† But soon after we are told of the discovery of the law-book. In the eighteenth year of the reign of Josiah, about 624 before Christ, while the temple was undergoing repairs, Hilkiah the priest says unto Shaphan the scribe, "I have found the book of the Law in the house of the Lord."‡ The fact is related to Josiah. The law is read to him. He is filled with alarm, because it has been so long neglected, and even disobeyed. He sends to a prophetess to learn his duty. He commences a general reform; and both he and his subjects take an oath to keep the law. He cut down the groves consecrated to idols.

"And the king commanded Hilkiah the high priest, and the priests of the second order, and the keepers of the door, to bring forth out of the temple of the Lord all the vessels that were made for Baal, and for the grove, and for all the host of heaven; and he burnt them without Jerusalem in the fields of Kidron, and carried the ashes of them unto Beth-el. And he put down the idolatrous priests, whom the kings of Judah had ordained to burn incense in the high places in the cities of Judah, and in the places round about Jerusalem; them also that burnt incense unto Baal, to the sun, and to the moon, and to the planets, and to all the host of heaven."§

He expelled the idol-priests from the cities of Judah. — "He took away the horses, that the kings of

* 2 Kings, xiv. 8.

† 2 Kings, xxiii. et seq.

‡ 2 Chron. xxix. — xxxi.

§ 2 Kings, xxiii. 4, 5.

Judah had given to the Sun, at the entering in at the house of the Lord." He removed the altar on the top of the house of Ahaz ; and those Manasseh had erected in the very courts of the temple. He destroyed the vestiges of Solomon's idolatry. He commands the prophet to keep the Passover, as it was written in the law. The writer adds, "Surely there was not holden such a Passover from the days of the Judges." *

Now if this book had been in existence eight or nine centuries, and all this time had been the law of the land, acknowledged as the word of God, could allusions to it be so rare in the history ? When the nation desired a king, would not the provision for such an emergency, made by the law, be mentioned ? Would monarchy be regarded as hostile to the institutions of the land, when the law-book encourages monarchy ? The law commands that the book of the Law shall be kept in the ark ; why do we not find it there ? If the laws had been so long known and obeyed, when the law-book was produced in the time of Josiah, would it excite such a "sensation ;" or lead to such a revolution in civil and ecclesiastical affairs ? We feel tempted to say, with Jeremiah, the contemporary of Josiah, "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, the God of Israel. * * * *I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt offerings or sacrifices, but this thing I commanded them, saying, Obey my voice.*" †

Again, some of the most important enactments of the Mosaic law were, at least, neglected from the period of his death to the reign of Josiah. The law demands that there shall be but one place of sacrifice. It insists earnestly upon this point. But sacrifices were offered at various places, by the proper officers. There were at least six favorite places of sacrifice, Mizpah, Gilgal, Bethel, Shiloh, Hebron, and Bochim.

* 2 Kings, xxiii. 21 - 23.

† Jeremiah, vii. 21 - 23.

It may be said that sacrifices were to be offered wherever the tabernacle rested. But the tabernacle could occupy but one place at the same time; and it appears from many passages, that sacrifices were offered contemporarily in several places. It appears that each man builds an altar where he pleases.* After David had built a tent at Jerusalem, to receive the wandering ark, sacrifices were offered in various places. This practice still continued, even after Solomon had built a temple, and was first abolished by Josiah.

The law forbids all sacrifices, except by the hand of the priests; yet David and Solomon perform the office of chief priests. The Levites do not appear to hold any distinct place in the nation, before the time of David. The drink-offering at Mizpah, Jephtha's offering of his daughter, the sacrifice of Saul's seven sons, — "slain before the Lord," as a sin-offering, — all these are foreign to the letter and the spirit of the law of Moses. We are not told that the Passover was kept from the time of Joshua to Hezekiah. If we are to credit the historian, the Sabbath was not kept for four hundred and ninety years, and for this neglect the nation is to remain in captivity the seventh part of that time, to keep a sabbath of seventy years.† Idolatry, a capital crime, high treason by the Mosaic law, always prevailed to a great extent. Horses, consecrated to the Sun, stood in the porch of Solomon's temple. The altars of idolatry disgraced its two courts. Magicians and false prophets, whom the law would put to death, were consulted by more than one king of Israel. There were three kings who ruled the whole land. Two were theists, the third an idolater. After the separation twenty kings ruled over Judah; fourteen of them were idolaters.

* See this subject treated at length by De Wette, *ubi supra*, § 226 et seq., and by Leo, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte des Jüdischen Staates*. Berlin. 1828. VI. Vorles.

† 2 Chronicles, xxxvi. 21.

Twenty also ascended the throne of Israel, and of them nineteen worshipped images.*

Such are some of the results of an examination of the external evidence, that Dr. Palfrey says,

“Is all, which on the supposition of its authenticity, we could expect under the circumstances to possess; and which would create a strong persuasion of the authenticity of the work, were not its contents thought to be such as to bring suspicion upon that hypothesis.” — pp. 79, 80.

Let us now consider the internal evidence. But before we proceed to examine particular portions of the Mosaic legislation, we would remark, that in our judgment, as a whole, this legislation far transcends all ancient codes. No other system has come down to us so thoroughly penetrated with love for man, with piety towards God. We can never adequately express our admiration of the beauty of some of its precepts; of the holy spirit displayed in many parts of it; of the rare political wisdom it evinces. What an influence have these laws exerted upon the world! Every christian lawgiver has been instructed by these hoary institutions. Some of them breathe the freshness of old time, when there was “open vision;” others seem animated by the breath of God. All men,—the stranger and the slave,—are brothers to the proudest Jew. God, the infinite King, watches over all. His eye sees the heart of the king; his arm sustains the beggar who is ready to perish. Some of the precious truths of Christianity had shed their splendor upon the writers of these books, whoever they were.† The voice of God speaks in them more clearly than in any other ancient laws.

* Constant de la Religion, ii. 233.

† “The appearance and the character of the Jewish theism at a time and among a people, equally incapable of conceiving the idea, and of preserving it when presented, are phenomena to my mind which cannot be explained by the common principles of reasoning. If that which I call revelation, divine teaching, light proceeding from the wisdom and goodness of God, be called by others an inward sentiment, the development of a germ implanted in the human soul, it

Dr. Palfrey asserts that in style these books resemble the compositions of the age of David and Solomon. Yet he adds, the difference between Deuteronomy and the Psalms of David is very nearly as great, as that between the latter and the writings of Malachi, (the last of the prophets,) if we except his Chaldaisms. It would be difficult to say why we are to make this exception; for the national language was exposed to corrupting influences in the time of Moses, and immediately afterwards,—especially during the long wars with other nations,—quite as powerful, as any it subsequently experienced. If it is possible that seventy persons should increase to a nation of three millions, while they were slaves in a land where they alone spoke this language, and still preserve it immaculate for four hundred and thirty years; if this language could be transmitted from the age of Moses to the time of David, with no farther alteration than the author allows, then it is not strange the nation should preserve it pure during seventy years of exile. But it did not continue pure during this latter period. What then preserved it at the age between Moses and Hezekiah? Was there a miracle wrought to defend it? Dr. Palfrey accounts for the slightness of the change in this period by asserting that “in the East the fashions of language do not rapidly change,” and cites Dr. Johnson to confirm it, who says, in substance, the language of a semi-barbarous people will continue long unchanged, if they are secluded from strangers. But the Jewish language, according to the author’s hypothesis, was formed in

is of little consequence. * * * We do not certainly recognise a divine revelation in the massacre of enemies, in the burning of cities, in the slaying of infants in the arms of their mothers. * * * We recognise the revelation made to Moses, in that portion of the Hebrew Scriptures, in which all the virtues are recommended, filial love, conjugal love, hospitality towards strangers, charity, friendship,—which no other legislation elevates to the rank of virtues,—justice, and even pity. Here is the divine voice. Here is the manifestation of Heaven on earth.”—*Philosophical Miscellanies, translated by George Ripley*. Boston. 1838. Vol. II. pp. 286–289.

the midst of strangers, and the nation was in contact with strangers long before David.

“Turning from the supposed adverse, to the favorable internal evidence,” says the writer, “I ask a Christian, who believes that whatever professes to proceed directly from a benevolent God, is recommended to his reception, in that character, by its apparent strong efficacy to preserve the purposes of God, in the religious improvement of his children, to observe the fitness of the law of Moses, to exert, and the fact of its having actually exerted, such an influence.” — p. 84.

If we understand the first part of this sentence, he believes that everything which *professes* to proceed from God, is *therefore* recommended to his reception by its apparently strong efficacy to serve the purposes of God. Now almost all the religions of the world make this pretence; but does it follow that they will serve the purposes of God, because they make this profession? Is the religion of Mahomet perfectly good and pure, because it professes to come directly from God? Having taken due notice of this antecedent value of religions which profess to come from God, the Christian is to observe the “fitness of the law of Moses to exert, and the fact of its having actually exerted, such an influence.” From what has already been said, it may be seen that the fruits borne before the time of the Captivity, are not of the most flattering character. But admitting the law had all the fitness claimed for it; that it was perfect; this fitness proves the excellence of the law, not its antiquity or divinity, unless all good laws are old, and the result of supernatural or miraculous inspiration.

The language of the Pentateuch furnishes the author with another argument. The chief difference between the language in these and in later books is this,—in the former, a masculine noun and pronoun are frequently used with a feminine signification. He cites Dr. Gesenius, the Magnus Apollo of Hebricians in these days, as authority to prove “both to be Archaisms,” referring to a well known work of the German writer. It is not for us to join issue with our author,

on a question of this nature, for we are "babes in Hebrew," and he the Coryphæus of philology. We rather prefer to rest the question with the author he has himself quoted. Nay, we will rest upon the very passage he cites, (p. 85, note,) for it contains matter to the purpose. "The language and usage of the Pentateuch," says Gesenius,* "in the historical sections, agree perfectly with those of the historical books. * * * However, the Pentateuch has some peculiarities." He then adduces the words above-mentioned, and adds, "These two forms have commonly been considered as Archaisms, and, in virtue of this, have been used as arguments in favor of the high antiquity of these books. This may be admitted, and they may be paralleled by the Latin forms, *Tulli, Terrai, Senatuis, &c.*, which, though somewhat more ancient, were used by some writers, as well as the common forms."

Again, "The work is written in the manner of a journal," says the author. But why then are there such chasms in his history? How can we account for the fact, that not a word is said of the long period between Joseph and Moses, so important in the Jewish history, — the formation period of the nation, of its language, and "common law?" If the language were so far perfected that the Pentateuch could be written in its beautiful style, immediately after the departure from Egypt, would there be no records of that period? Would not Moses collect these, as he did the earlier documents of less important ages?† If "Moses wrote a journal," why is there no history of his nation from the second till the fortieth year of the Exode? Why is there no minute account of his proceedings until the twentieth day of the second month of the second year, and so meagre a narrative after it? Why is the list of the resting places so im-

* Gesenius geschichte der Hebräischen sprache und schrift. Leipzig. 1815. § 11, 31, 32.

† We suppose the author considers Moses the compiler of the book of Genesis.

perfect, some of them being an hundred miles from any one of the others?

Again, "There are laws, which breathe the desert air," some of which, it seems, "wasted their fragrance" on it, as they were repealed before they were put in practice. One of these "laws, which breathe the desert air," is that relating to the feasts. It had "its first occasion in the necessity of preventing the people from wandering too far from home, while they were in the desert." Now we read, that the most important of these feasts was established while the nation was in Egypt. He himself says, (p. 137,) it was a commemoration of the deliverance from bondage, and not merely an ingenious device to keep shepherds at home.* Besides, be it observed, that during the whole pilgrimage of forty years, the Pass-over was celebrated but once,† for this very good reason,—the nation was not yet delivered from danger and hardship. How could they celebrate a feast of deliverance before they were delivered?‡ We are not told in these books, that the feast of Pentecost, or the feast of Tabernacles, was ever kept during the life of Moses. It was kept, perhaps for the first time, by Ezra.§ Yet it was during this period of the residence in the wilderness, that these feasts would have exerted their best influence, according to our author.

But if some of these laws grew out of the occasion, what shall be said of the numerous enactments, alleged to be prospective, which belong to a different state of society; which "breathe the air" of the city, rather than that of the desert? If the one favors, the other opposes the authenticity. Let an impartial reader examine the Mosaic legislation, and

* See De Wette, *ubi supra*, § 293–298.

† Numbers, ix. 4, 5.

‡ When Aaron had made the calf he appointed a feast. "And the people sat down to eat and to drink, and rose up to play."—Exodus, xxii. 5, 6.

§ Ezra, iii. 4.

he will find statutes which could only proceed from a nation, who were already firmly established, and had made considerable progress in civilization. Such are the laws concerning real property, the amount to be paid the Levites, the duties of kings, and many others. It may be said the laws all proceeded directly from the revelation of God, and since all times are alike to the revelator, it is of no importance when they were revealed. "As we flew by enchantment, so we saw by enchantment," said the Spanish prototype of these reasoners.

He considers the "anthropomorphic character of some representations of the divine Being, * * * as just so much proof to us of the early origin of the book." If they prove the "early origin," according to his hypothesis, they prove also its supernatural, miraculous origin. He says "these representations would be out of place, if prepared for the refined age of David, or Solomon, or Hezekiah." But "representations of the divine Being," equally anthropomorphic, are found in the book of Daniel, which was written much later. And it does not appear that the author of the Pentateuch was much more inclined to such representations than his present commentator, who thinks the Almighty not only spoke with a human voice, and displayed his glory in a burning bush; in a bright cloud; and in loud thunders, but made laws never to be carried into execution, and established the Jewish ritual to sustain his own honor! * We see not why the text and the comment could not have proceeded from the same hand.

These books do not all agree amongst themselves. There are striking discrepancies between Deuterono-

* Let it not be thought the author is misrepresented. These are his words. "Is it not an intelligible, and, * * * a probable thing, that as an independent object, *God's honor* was to be consulted by his worship not being permitted to be wholly banished from this earth?"—p. 92. The great Apostle to the Gentiles has answered this question. "*God*, that made the world and all things therein, * * * dwelleth not in temples made with hands; *neither is worshipped with men's hands as though he needed anything.*"—Acts, xvii. 24, 25.

my and the preceding books. In one book a certain command proceeds from God ; in another from Moses.* A particular counsel is ascribed to God, in one book, but to the people, in another. It is said the Edomites would not suffer the Jews to pass through their state, and again this is contradicted.† The laws relating to false prophets, to divorce, and to kings are peculiar to the book of Deuteronomy. This book gives greater authority to the Levites than the other books; yet it does not mention the forty-eight Levitical cities. Our limits prevent us from proceeding to further details upon this point ; but these are sufficient for our purpose.

There are other inconsistencies, still more obvious, in these books. Pharaoh issues a decree for murdering all the male infants who are born among the Hebrews ; yet eighty years afterwards there are six hundred thousand adult men in the nation. It is said the Supreme Being was not known to the Patriarchs by his name Jehovah ; yet he appears to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as known by that name.

Is it possible in the nature of things, that a body of three millions of people could effect such a march as that described in these books ? How could they pass the Red Sea by a narrow strip of land in a single night ? Will Dr. Palfrey avail himself of a miracle to account for this passage, as well as for the removal of the waters ? (Here, be it observed, Josephus makes no miracle.) How could they be supported, fed, and clothed, for forty years ? The answer is obvious ; a miracle was continually repeated. But our author cannot be sheltered by this position, for he says miracles could not be repeated for forty years ; they would wear out. But admitting they were *fed* by the “supernaturally increased production of a natural product,” how were they clothed ? Could a wandering body of three millions of run-away slaves

* Deuteronomy, i. 22 ; Numbers, xiii. 1, 2.

† Numbers, xx. 14–21 ; Deuteronomy, ii. 29.

possess sheep and cattle enough to furnish them with garments of leather or of cloth? Was a miracle wrought to teach the Hebrews the art of shepherds and husbandmen; or were their garments miraculously preserved during this long period, as some suppose? Is it possible that such a body of undisciplined men, exposed to manifold trials and perils, embarked in an expedition which they detested, whose progress was painful and tedious, its end distant and uncertain, could be controlled by a single man, without subordinate officers to aid him, and that at a time when his sister heads a rebellion, and his brother makes an idol and worships it? We do not impiously limit the power of the Almighty, when we say he acts by the laws he has made, not against them; and certainly if this expedition really took place as described in these books, then all the common motives which govern mankind ceased to act, and principles, never known before, never since, took their place.

The tabernacle is represented as a costly building, fifty-four feet in length, eighteen in breadth, and the same in height. This pavilion was made of the most costly materials; "of fine twined linen," skins of costly die, precious wood, and gold and silver. The gold and silver employed in the structure, independently of the brass, wood, skins, and labor, have been estimated at the value of nearly a million of dollars." Taking this as the basis, the cost of the edifice could not have been less than three millions of dollars. Whence did the Jews obtain this wealth; these costly materials? Did fugitive slaves bring them from Egypt? Gold and silver could not be very abundant in the camp, for, before the erection of the tabernacle, the people were obliged to contribute the ear-rings of their wives and daughters to furnish materials for the golden calf.*

* The ornaments of the tent were wrought with such exquisite skill, that two of the workmen were accounted inspired "to devise curious work." But centuries later, there was not a "smith in Is-

While the nation was travelling from place to place, would not such a building be exceedingly cumbrous? It must have been carried through a sandy waste and in the midst of enemies. It was not borne on railway cars, but on the shoulders of men.

We find it difficult to believe that quails fell in such abundance that throughout an area sixty-six miles in diameter, they lay two cubits deep; or that "he that gathered least gathered ten homers," eighty bushels!* Perhaps it is unjust to mention this instance, for there must be an error in the statement of the quantity which each man gathered, though our author notices no such error.

But if all these objections could be removed, there is one consideration which alone would lead us to doubt the authenticity of these books. It arises from the character of the laws themselves. If the books are pronounced genuine, and literally true, then we must refer all their laws to God, as their direct and immediate author, except in a few cases already mentioned. Now who is ready to maintain that the Almighty makes his appearance in a visible form to announce these laws, in words, in the Hebrew tongue? † Are we to suppose he gives directions about "rams' skins died red, and badgers' skins;" "oil for the light and spices for anointing oil?" Are all the minute rules relating to the dress and purification of the priest, the soldiers, and others, to be regarded as laws verbally uttered by the Most High? Still more, will the God, who is a father, and whose brightest

rael." The soldiers used neither sword nor spear. (1 Sam. xiii. 19.) Even Solomon found it impossible to erect his temple without recourse to foreign artists. Admitting the existence of such a tabernacle as this, a miracle is necessary to account for the fact that such materials were in the hands of the Hebrews; and again that such cunning artists were found among them.

* Numbers, xi. 31, 32.

† "It was a literal sound which conveyed the sense" on Mount Horeb, "and not an internal impression only."—p. 104. Though sometimes he thinks communications were made without an articulate voice.

attribute is love, enact such laws as those which enjoin the total extermination of certain tribes of the Canaanites? Is it God who commands that defenceless old men, unprotected women, innocent babes shall be savagely slaughtered with every aggravation of cruelty? Shall it be said they were idolaters? What then were the Hebrews? We are indeed told that Jehovah would in like manner have exterminated all the Hebrew nation, save the descendants of Moses, had not Moses interceded for them. Can a Christian attribute such commands to the Father of Gentile and Jew; to the God of Love? Our author admits that the divine origin must be given up, if it be proved that immoralities are commanded, or unworthy views of the Deity presented. One would suppose the question then was already settled, for both the immorality and the unworthy views are apparent. He admits that the representations of the Deity are rude and anthropomorphic. Nay, he considers this fact proof of the early origin of the book.

Now he is bound by his own assertions to admit one of two things, — either these rude anthropomorphic representations of the divine Being, are not unworthy, but true; that God *is* such a Being as he is here represented; or, to admit the books are not of divine origin.

We here close our remarks upon the authenticity of the *Pentateuch*. We have not labored to construct an argument, but to state some of the difficulties we have encountered in repeated perusals and a careful study of these writings. Nor have we done this because we are desirous of magnifying these difficulties, for they are obvious and well known. We have written what we have in no spirit of hostility to the books of Moses, for we regard them as worthy of deep admiration, and we will go as far as Dr. Palfrey himself in praise of their general wisdom and humanity. We offer no theory on the composition of these writings, for we are not teachers, but humble inquirers on the outskirts of theology; who would gladly find

access to the Holy of Holies, where immortal Truth is manifest.*

Several topics, discussed by the author, present themselves to our notice. He conceives the design of the Mosaic revelation was to put the Hebrew nation "in possession of a purer theology, and to place them in a condition to preserve," "and to communicate it to the rest of the world." Now the distinctive feature of this pure theology is the unity of God. The Jews were theists, while, it is alleged, the surrounding nations were polytheists. Dr. Palfrey thinks the facts of these books alone serve to explain this peculiarity of the Hebrew religion; and that the wonderful incidents, mentioned therein, were brought about to "authenticate the revelation" of this pure theology; in other words, that the miracles recorded in these books were wrought to authenticate the truth, that there is ONE GOD. Admit the truth of the Mosaic history, says he, and all is plain; deny it, all is perplexing.

Now in this reasoning, two things seem to be taken for granted:—The fact that the divine unity was *first* taught by Moses; and again, that man, unaided by a supernatural revelation, accompanied with miracles, could never arrive at this truth. A word may be said upon each of these assumptions.

The unity of the Supreme Being was taught long before the time of Moses. To prove this, it is not necessary to refer to the doubtful annals of the Celestial Empire; nor, to the uncertain writings of the sages of Hindostan, which transmit this doctrine from the hoariest ages of the world. We find an easier proof, in the Scripture itself. If the accounts in Genesis may be relied upon, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob

* What is here alleged against the authenticity of the *Pentateuch* must be taken merely as a statement of difficulties, not as a profession of faith or want of faith on the part of the writer, much less of the editor of this work. ED.

were pure theists. Jehovah was their God. The oldest of them lived six hundred and forty-five years before the departure from Egypt, if we follow the common chronology. The doctrine of the unity was an old doctrine in the time of Moses, — a doctrine familiar to his fathers. What need then of a new revelation to teach this old doctrine? What need of miracles to confirm what had been believed six centuries before without a miracle? Had this once familiar truth faded from the memories of men? Which inheres longest in the mind, — falsehood or truth? From the author's admission, the doctrine of the divine unity outlasts the wreck of systems, — the most valuable being ever the most vital truth.* Was this doctrine unknown in Egypt in the time of Moses? Two eminent antiquarians, Cudworth and Jablonski, maintain, not without good reason, that it was well known.† It is true, polytheism prevailed among the common people. But was not idolatry popular, — favored by the king and the subject, — in the Hebrew nation, a thousand years after Moses? The Egyptian priests could scarcely be unacquainted with this doctrine. Their mysteries and scientific culture would lead to this opinion. They were the first civilized people, says Herodotus, who believed the immortality of the soul. However, the ancient religion of Egypt is still but imperfectly understood.

Again; is it philosophical to assume that a peculiar revelation is needed to impart this doctrine, and miracles to authenticate the revelation? The assumption makes a broad distinction between divine truth and human truths. The latter can be discovered by the common use of the intellectual faculties; the former, he pretends, can only be made known by a direct, immediate communication from God, accompanied with

* See pp. 95, 96, note.

† But see Meiners. *Historia Doctrinæ de Vero Deo*. Vol. I. ch. i. He remarks that the arguments of Cudworth are not worthy of notice, and brings serious objections to those of Jablonski.

rare phenomena, to authenticate them. Now are there two such classes of truths? Must all knowledge of God, of Duty, of Religion, be imparted to us from without, and sanctioned by miracles, before we can receive it? The words of an old writer are to the point. "We affirm that those precepts, which learned men of the Gentiles, influenced by the general sentiment and judgment of nature, have committed to writing, are not less divine than those which are extant in the stone tables of Moses. * * * Nor does our Heavenly Father wish that the laws he wrote in stone should be more valued by us than those he has imprinted on the very sentiments of our souls."*

Is there not a sentiment in human nature, which impels us to worship the Infinite God? If not, religion has no foundation in man's soul, and divine communications would find no ear to listen. The marble could be religious as well as the man. Does not this sentiment, this highest instinct of the soul, act with the same certainty as the humbler, the physical instincts?

The merest savage knows there is one God. True, he has his *fetiché*,—a stone, or a crocodile. These are to satisfy the want of the moment. The Catholic, unable to rise to the Infinite, worships the Virgin, or the Son, or the Saints, or their images. But far above these objects of adoration he sees the SUPREME. There is a something, he knows not what, too vast for comprehension; invisible; inscrutable; dwelling apart from the universe. HIM, he acknowledges, but does not adore. "We pray not to HIM," says a savage, "for he takes no concern in the world; we offer Him no sacrifice, for he needs nothing." The Indian worships not the Buffaloe, but the Manitou of Buffaloes.

The farther we go back in primitive history, the more certainly do we find a belief in the unity of God. The descendants of Abraham were monotheists, till

* Melancthon. Præf. in Hæc. in Meiners, ubi sup.

they migrated to Egypt, where the artifice of the priests had, in part, corrupted the primeval faith of man.* How was this faith acquired? From "the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." "The spirit searcheth all things; yea, *the*

* Nothing is intended to be asserted by this expression, inconsistent with the view of man's religious progress, taken by Benjamin Constant and others, and which supposes the earliest form of religion was Fetichism, succeeded by Polytheism, through which men found their way to Theism. Logically considered, the idea of unity is older than that of plurality, as the Infinite is older than the Finite; but chronologically, the reverse is true. We learn things in the concrete before we do in the abstract. We behold the Creature before we conceive of the Creator, and are familiar with finite existences long before we have any well defined belief in one Infinite Being.

Nevertheless the Idea of the Infinite, of Unity, of one God, is in the reason from the first, and is active there from the moment of our first experience. It lies at the bottom of all our affirmations, and forms the ground of all our religious feelings, faith, and hopes. But it lies there in darkness. We are affected by its presence, but we do not see it. It does not become a fact of consciousness, till we have found all the things around us variable and transitory, and sufficient neither for themselves, nor for the wants of the soul. There is from the first a vague sentiment of the Infinite floating in the dark regions of the soul, though it is a long time before it shapes itself into the belief in one God. The religious sentiment is the craving of the soul after the Infinite, and is ever urging us towards it; but at first it seeks it in the Finite. It seeks it in the ill-shapen Fetich; then in something more beautiful or more useful, in the sun or stars; and then in the spirit of the sun, in the spirit of the stars; gradually refining and elevating itself, it rises above the sun-spirit, the star-spirit, and bodies forth a Jupiter, Father of gods and king of men; and then higher yet, it attains to one God, an absolute God, Cause, Life, Substance of all that is, — absolute Being, wise, good, benevolent, — a Father, merciful and kind. Now in calling Theism the primitive faith of mankind, it is not meant that belief in one God, as here stated, was the belief with which they commenced, but that all their religious instincts and conceptions, from the first, implied such a being, and could be legitimated only on the fact of his existence. The one God always hovered over the religious beliefs of mankind. Therefore the natural development of their beliefs would necessarily lead to Theism. Just in proportion as men studied and comprehended their religious instincts, would they approach it. If left to themselves, they would, in the proper time, of themselves, come to the belief in one God; and if before that time, unless there were some supernatural enlargement or development of the faculties of those who were to receive it, as well as of him who was to reveal it, a supernatural announcement of the truth of one God

depths of God." This faith proceeds from revelation ; but is it not from the Divine *in* man the revelation comes ? "The inspiration of the Almighty" hath given understanding to each ; but if the first revelation from consciousness be that of unity, the idea of

were made, it could not reveal him, or give to mankind either the conception of one God or a belief in him.

Admitting, as most critics have done, that Moses was the virtual author of the Pentateuch, it does not follow that he was the first who taught the doctrine of one God. Indeed it may be questioned whether he taught the doctrine at all, or even believed it. The strict monotheism of the Pentateuch is far from being so certain as some people have thought. It may, perhaps, be maintained, that Moses taught one God only for Israel. Other nations had many gods ; the Egyptians were famous for the number of their gods ; but Israel was to have only one God. "Hear, O Israel, the Lord *thy* God is one, Jehovah." Is not this the meaning of the declaration, "Thou shalt have no other gods, before me ?" That is, the Israelites were to acknowledge only one God, and were to hold him to be superior to all other gods, or the gods of other nations. The author of the Pentateuch does by no means deny the godship of the gods of the nations, and in one instance forbids any one to do it. He invariably speaks of Jehovah as the God of Israel. The idea, which runs through the whole Pentateuch, appears to be that Jehovah had chosen the Israelites to be his people, and that if they would worship him in preference to all other gods, he would make them the greatest nation on earth, and prove himself to be the greatest God of all gods. This is not monotheism.

Then again, admitting Moses did reveal the doctrine of one God, it does not follow that the wonderful events recorded in the Pentateuch were designed to authenticate it, or that they did or were capable of serving that purpose. It is nowhere said in the Pentateuch itself, or in any other part of the Bible, that this was their design. He who says it was has no scriptural authority to support him. They did not serve this purpose, for while they were taking place before their very eyes, the Jews continued to be idolaters, and there is no evidence that they ever ceased to be idolaters till after the Babylonish captivity. According to their own history, their monotheism cannot be dated very far back. They could not serve the purpose alleged. A proof must be more obvious and certain than the proposition it is adduced to prove, otherwise it is no proof. If it be not more obvious and certain that the miracle is from God, than it is that there is but one God, how can it prove the doctrine of the Divine Unity ? Before a miracle can be admitted to be from God, it must be known there is a God ; and before it can be alleged as a proof of one God, it must be known with *infallible certainty*, that there is only one God who can perform it. So then, before the miracle can authenticate a revelation of one God, it must be known that there is

divinity speedily follows. The diverse effects of nature must proceed from different causes, say men. Therefore a Nymph pours the river from her invisible urn; a God guides the sun's fire-chariot through the sky; one Deity calls forth the stars, another rules the

but one God; all that the miracle is designed to prove must, then, be believed before the miracle can prove anything.

Again; it may be said, that miracles indeed cannot prove the doctrines, but they authenticate the mission of him who reveals them; they establish the fact, that he speaks by Divine authority, and therefore that he is worthy of credit. According to Dr. Palfrey, Moses performed real miracles, and the magicians performed sham miracles; but the spectators could not tell the difference. In this case the sham miracles were as good evidence to the spectators, that the magicians were divinely commissioned, as the real ones were that Moses was. Knowing, as those spectators probably did, that the miracles of the magicians were sham miracles, how were they to be prevented from inferring that those of Moses were not also sham miracles? How could they know that the miracles of Moses were real miracles? How can we know it? The testimony of the by-standers would be good for nothing, if we had it, because they saw no difference between the wonderful acts of Moses, and the bungling imitations of them by the magicians. How then? Because Moses himself tells us? How is it to be known now that Moses tells the truth, or how was it to be known then that he told the truth? Because he could work miracles? But the fact that he could work miracles rests merely on his word; how then can the alleged miracles be a proof that his word is to be believed? Will the advocates of miracles help us out of this circle?

Again; if I am ignorant of God, why is the performance of an act, passing my comprehension, a more certain proof to me of a divine commission, than is the teaching of a doctrine passing my comprehension? Before the act can authenticate the fact, that he who performs it is commissioned by God, we must know enough of God, to know positively that the agency, by which it is performed, can be none other than His immediate agency. Now if we know so much of God, as to know this, with infallible certainty as we must, why do we not know enough of God to know that the man is divinely commissioned, from the simple doctrine he teaches, without any recurrence at all to the miracle? If I know God, I know from what the man says, whether he speaks by divine authority or not; if I do not know God, I cannot know that His is the agency, which performs the miracle; therefore the miracle cannot establish the divine authority of the apparent miracle-worker. This is the defect in all miraculous testimony. It can never authenticate a revelation or divine commission to those who know not God, and to those who do know him it is superfluous. ED.

deep. Yet the deep, mysterious sentiment looks ever to *One* above the Nymph, the Sun-God, the Ruler of the Sky and Sea. Hence polytheism is based on a belief in the One God. In the twilight of idolatry, there are gleams of the Light which has once shone, and is to reappear. "God is one," says the oldest book of the Bramins; "everlasting; the creator of the world-all. Like a ball, he hath neither beginning nor end. By everlasting and everchanging laws, he governs the world. Mortal, inquire not thou too far, in searching the essence or the nature of the Eternal. It is enough for thee to examine Day and Night; the greatness of his works; his wisdom; his power; his goodness." The name of this being is Ekhumesha, "the one who always was." *

Now, if this doctrine of the divine unity did not form the primitive belief of all nations; if even it were not known to the Hebrew nation before the time of Moses, how could his miracles impart the idea? What force could they add to his argument? If his doctrine was true, it needed not the support of miracles; if false, no miracles could make it true. We have always been pleased with the remarks of an old Jewish writer upon this point. "The Hebrews did not believe our father Moses, on account of the miracles he wrought, for, in the mind of the believer, there might be a suspicion in regard to the miracle. It might have been that some wrought the miracle by incantation, or sorcery. But all the miracles of Moses in the Desert, he wrought through the necessity of the occasion, and not to establish the proof of his mission as a prophet; for a man may work a miracle and show a sign, and yet be no prophet." † In another place he adds that Moses was never believed on account of his miracles. Moses himself makes

* This is extracted from a book adjudged to have been written (?) in its present form, (?) 1600 B. C. (?) See Rhöde religiöse Bildung, Mythologie und Philosophie der Hindus. (Leip. 1827. 8vo.) Bd. I. § 115-121, 434 et seq.

† Maimonides de fundamentis legis, viii § 1.

the doctrine, and not the miracle, the test of inspiration.

If a man have not a true conception of the unity of God, how can a miracle help him to form that conception? A command, it is true, may be uttered by the Most High, in words in the Hebrew tongue, but will this impart an idea of the one true God? Dr. Palfrey thinks this truth could not be ascertained without miracles to authenticate it; and maintains that such miracles were granted only to the Jews. If other nations did not know this truth, they must necessarily be idolaters, since they must worship something. Yet for this idolatry, — according to our author, — they were destroyed; — were punished for their ignorance of what they could not know. Idolatry is always denounced as a sin in the Scriptures. This shows plainly that man has power, without supernatural aid, to arrive at the truth.

Among two classes of men, we find that a belief in the unity of God, like that of the immortality of the soul, will prevail; among the simple, who trust the native religious instinct of the heart, and among those who have learned to see the identity of spontaneous sentiment, and the sublimest conclusions of the intellect. Between these two, there is a large class, neither simple enough to trust the heart, nor sufficiently wise to discover this truth with the mind.

Now let the doctrine in question be announced to this middle class, — announced by the very voice of the Almighty, with all the apparatus of clouds, and thunder, and darkness, and lightning, and trumpets, and gorgeous mountain scenery, which the most obdurate critic claims for Moses, — and it will not be understood. Let these miracles be repeated till they cease to be miracles, (according to Dr. Palfrey's ingenious theory,) still the doctrine will not inhere in the material mind. The history of the Jews proves this assertion. To enlighten the nation, and to purify their hearts, were the only methods of rendering them monotheists. Miracles repeated never so often cannot

effect this. If then we admit the authenticity of these books, the strangest problem is presented, "authenticating" miracles are profusely wrought, the people take little heed thereof: they refuse to receive the truth miraculously authenticated as it is; they fall down and worship a golden calf, while Moses veiled in the most awful pomp, before their eyes, holds communion with God, face to face. They were nourished by the "supernaturally increased production of a natural product," watered and clothed, guided and governed by miracles,—yet refused to believe in the power, or listen to the authority of Him who wrought these miracles, for the sake of producing this belief. Such is the importance of miracles to work conviction upon eye witnesses. Abraham, in his simple heart, had believed this doctrine, though not taught by miracles, six centuries before. In later times, when the people had made farther advance in civilization,—after the Babylonian exile,—we hear of no farther relapses into idolatry, though there was no "open vision," and no miracles were wrought.

Dr. Palfrey believes Moses wrought real miracles in Egypt before Pharaoh, while the magicians were mere jugglers, who performed curious tricks by legerdemain. The king of Egypt could not distinguish the real from the pretended miracle. Is it not somewhat irreverent to state that the Almighty works miracles with a certain design, which cannot be distinguished by an eye witness from common feats of jugglery? It were as reasonable to believe with Dr. Doddridge, that the latter were "wrought by superior evil beings." These miracles in Egypt, it is to be observed, were not wrought for the same or a similar purpose with those in the wilderness. The former were to induce Pharaoh to "let Israel go," the latter to prove the unity of God. The former "did not propose to prove, even to the Jews, that their national God was the only God; * * * still less were they designed to prove this to the Egyptians."

Here Jehovah is represented, "as the God of the

Jews only," says the author, who thinks this fact is an argument to prove the work written by the inspired Moses; a singular argument truly. He thinks there was a supernatural production of frogs, at the command of Aaron. But the magicians merely "used some substance to attract into a vacant space some specimens of an animal, whose habits are so well known."

He denies the "supernatural nature" of the fire-pillar and the cloud. But, as we have before observed, they become miraculous agents when occasion demands. He is ready to admit a miracle, when a miracle is necessary, that is, when it affords the easiest explanation of a passage. May we not say that a miracle is to our author, what "enchantment" was to a certain knight,—the universal solvent of difficulties?

The author sees an especial fitness in the magnificent scenery around Mount Sinai, in the "flaming and smoking top" of the mountain, in the awful drapery of clouds, in the thunder and lightning, in the midst of which the law was announced,—to make a deep impression upon the minds of the people. We must confess there is "an abstract fitness," to use his own expression, in such a spectacle, but we ask him to tell us why it failed to make the anticipated impression?

Soon after, with similar pomp, to follow the text of Exodus, the whole nation promises to obey these laws. How solemn the scene; what a profound impression must it make! Soon they will clamor to return to Egypt; worship a golden calf. Singular result! Could no one "contrive to discern those *thirteen* most poor, mean-dressed men, at a frugal Supper, in a mean Jewish dwelling, with no symbol but hearts God-initiated into that "Divine depth of Sorrow," and a *Do this in remembrance of me?* *

The work fails to explain many difficult passages. In Exodus, xxiv. 9–11, it is said, that Moses and

* Carlyle's French Revolution.

seventy three others "saw the God of Israel, and under his feet, as it were, a paved work of a sapphire stone," &c. The explanation of the author is, "They saw a splendor in the sky, above all earthly things, and were made to know that there, in heaven, Jehovah, the God of their nation, had his place and government." — p. 184. Does this explanation remove the difficulty? This appears to be one of the passages of which he says, "a confession of ignorance is at once most fair, most modest, and most safe." — p. 229.

The anthropomorphitic character of the Supreme Being in these books is but poorly explained. Nothing can be plainer to every reader, than this fact, that God is spoken of as having a body, and hands, and feet, throughout these books. The author admits the anthropomorphitic character of the representations of God, when it favors his argument, but again (p. 224 et seq.) he attempts, very unsatisfactorily, to explain it on another hypothesis.

It has usually been thought difficult to account for the fact alleged, Exodus xvii. 11, that in time of battle, when Moses held up his hand the Jews prevailed, but when his hand sunk his enemies were victorious, and, that to insure the victory, two of his attendants supported his hand. Our author finds "no difficulty in the matter." The universal solvent is at hand, — a miracle. "When the people saw the banner of the Lord in his hand, * * * *always insuring to them victory*, [?] as long as it was raised, [how could they know this?] and leaving them to defeat when it sank, they took an impressive lesson concerning the power, which he was authorized to exert over them, and the divine protection he enjoyed, shared by themselves as long as they yielded to his guidance." — pp. 159, 160.

On the same principles (?) he explains the cures effected by the brazen serpent.*

Sometimes the author rises above these principles. Men, says he, "inquired of God," when they came to

* Numbers, xxi. 4-9.

Moses for his arbitration on disputed questions; he pronounced judgment agreeably to established principles of equity, such as God is understood to approve; and this he called "making them know the statutes of God and his laws." — p. 146. It is to be wished the spirit, which dictated the above paragraph, had prevailed more widely in this volume. This is an application of a principle previously laid down, viz. that we are at liberty to suppose any one of these laws really proceeded from Moses, though bearing the name of God. In the same spirit, the "Eagle of the synagogue" says, "when any man feels his powers excited, impelling him to speak, — whether he speaks of sciences or arts, or utters psalms and hymns, or moral precepts, or discourses of political affairs, — he speaks by the Holy Spirit."

But we must bring these remarks to a close. We have treated Dr. Palfrey's work with freedom, but we trust not with severity. It is not precisely the work the public expected; nor is it such a one as the wants of the public most needed. It is not the work Dr. Palfrey, in justice to himself, to his position, the institution and class of Christians with which he is connected, should have produced. We fear that it will do little to enhance his reputation, or that of the University of Cambridge, to draw young men to the School, in which he is a Professor, or to inspire confidence in the Biblical instructions he is imparting to the future teachers of Liberal Christianity. We do not think it likely to commend the Old Testament to those who have hitherto wanted confidence in it, or to subdue the strong prejudices which exist, far and wide, against that form of Christianity he is generally understood to uphold.

Nevertheless we regard this book as a valuable accession to our Biblical Literature, not indeed because it has accomplished everything, but because it shows an earnest desire to do something. It treats an important subject, and with more freedom and critical sagacity than it has been before treated in

this country, and puts forth principles, which, in other hands, may lead to valuable results. It breaks the ice, and lays open the Jewish antiquities to the free action of reason and philology. It commences a movement, that may continue long, and go far before it is arrested. In these respects the publication is opportune, and should be cordially greeted. Moreover, the book breathes an earnest spirit. The author is serious in what he does. He has evidently aimed to do a service to Biblical Literature, and for this we thank him, and take what he has given us without complaint. For ourselves we wish the work had been different. But we have no right to dictate to an author.

We cannot avoid expressing our belief, that the author would have done himself better justice, had he extended his researches further. It is true he gives us ample proof of zeal and diligence, but there are many valuable works on his subject, which he seems not to have consulted, or which at least he appears to have made no use of. This remark is especially true, as it regards the later German works. It is true he may not esteem very highly what is called German Theology. Yet he can hardly deem it useless to consult, in such a work as this, the best German writers, who treat the same subject. Moreover, there are scholars among us, whose opinions deserve great weight, who are far from thinking lightly of German theology, who in fact regard Germany very much as a "New East," out of which the Bethlehem Star of theology is to arise, and guide us to a place of rest, where we may repose under the branches of the Tree of Life, screened alike from the icy blast of Skepticism, and the red simoon of Superstition and Fanaticism. Inquiry there is thought to be more free, than it is here. In that land men have no fears of Truth, for all truth is known to be God's truth. There each man follows what is right in his own eyes, and utters the word God gives him to utter; while here all follow their leaders, think the same

thoughts, speak the same words, and start at the same shadows. Now the works of scholars, where there is this freedom, this single-eyed pursuit of truth, and this bold utterance of one's own convictions, must needs have no small value over the works of scholars who can see, think, and speak only according to a prescribed formula. No man could fail to be profited by a careful study of them. We regard it, then, as a serious defect in Dr. Palfrey's work, that it shows so little familiarity with the best productions of late German scholars.

Many works have recently appeared in Germany, which treat of the subjects discussed in this volume. Some of them must be admitted by every one to be of great value. De Wette, in a single work, which we have more than once cited in this article, has done more for the history of the Jews, says Professor Leo, than Niebuhr for that of Rome, or Heeren for that of Greece. Yet these works are never cited in the volume before us. It is clear the author has never seen them. This is a grave defect in such a work as this, on such a subject as is here treated, and one we find it extremely difficult to overlook. For such a work as this should not only contain the results of the author's own observations, but those of his contemporaries, as well as those of his predecessors. For aught that appears, this work might have been written a quarter of a century ago. What should be said of a Naturalist, who should write a book on Geology, or on Zoölogy, connecting only the writings published, at least a quarter of a century before him, thus rejecting the discoveries of all his fellow inquirers?

Perhaps, in justice to Dr. Palfrey, we should say he probably did not intend to write a work for the learned, nor for that portion of the *clergy* who do not aspire to that title, but for those who, in his own words, may be called "the better sort" of unlearned laymen. We are inclined to adopt this conclusion from the fact, that what he has given us, that is new or original, will be regarded by theologians as

of no great importance, while the really valuable remarks, he has scattered throughout his work, are already familiar to them in the writings of Clericus, Grotius, or, in a word, in Rosenmüller's well known Scholia. There they have found the same remarks, the same difficulties disposed of, the same authorities referred to, and the same passages cited. Verily, says the Wise Man, there is nothing new under the sun. The thing that hath been, the same shall be. The writings of commentators are like a French saloon, hung round with mirrors, wherein objects "multiform and mix," all the mirrors reflecting the same things. But they create nothing new, save illusions. Still the service rendered by this work is important, though little credit may be due it on the score of originality. It contains essentially the views of Rosenmüller, and gives them to us in tolerable English, instead of tolerable Latin. This work is small, that of Rosenmüller is large. But if the former is more brief, the latter is more satisfactory. If the one is condensed, it has the faults of an abridgment, obscurity and weakness. If the other is diffuse, it is usually clear, often profound, and sometimes forcible. The one is compact; the other orderly. Rosenmüller was an indefatigable, ingenious, and learned man. He had lived long in the world of literature; had written more than most men have read. He was at once a natural philosopher, an antiquarian, a philologist, and a theologian. He was an universal scholar. His net swept the bottom of the great deep of theology; it collected the treasures which all ages and every land had contributed. From resources so vast, what gems did he gather! In his treasury were things old and new. Peace to his shade. Other writers have outstripped him, but he taught many to walk, and never lamented when his pupils outran his instructions.

The merit of this work, though mainly that of giving in English what existed in Latin, is, after all, no slight one. For the last quarter of a century what have the English theologians done for the Old Testa-

ment? Not a ray of light have they shed on the Egyptian darkness, which, to them, overhangs the laws of Moses. Like Ajax they are stumbling in the shade. They even, with creeds and formularies, close up the windows of morning, and repel the light just risen in the East. Dr. Palfrey deserves warm gratitude for his efforts to dispel the shadows, and to enable us to behold the beauty, and to comprehend the worth, the divine worth, of the Jewish Scriptures. Philosophy may not admit all his premises; nor history verify all his conclusions; yet his assertions will awaken other scholars; his principles will guide them to better rules, to a farther light, to a clearer vision, to a juster reverence for the word of God.

"So" books "appear imperfect, and but given
 With purpose to resign them, in full time,
 Up to a better covenant, *disciplined*
From shadowy types to Truth; from flesh to Spirit,
 * * * * * from servile fear
 To filial; works of Law, to works of Faith."

ART. II. — *An Inquiry into the Moral and Religious Character of the American Government.* New York: Wiley & Putnam. 1838. 8vo. pp. 208.

THIS is a work written with some ability, possibly with a sincere intention, and probably for a good end. Most religious people, — not accustomed to much reflection on the subject it treats, — will think it an admirable book, and be inclined to receive it as a sort of second Gospel. In our judgment it is the production of a man who has very little knowledge of religion in general, and none of Christianity in particular. The author designs to point out the relation which should subsist between Christianity and civil government, and to place certain matters, which

have not hitherto been very well understood, in a new and clearer light; but so far as we can come at the results of his Inquiry, he merely makes "confusion worse confounded."

Who the author of this book is we know not; but, be he who he may, we should like to know his name, that we might give him an immortality, which he has not secured to himself by this production. He belongs to the "Blue Ruin" party, both in politics and religion. He is a genuine croaker, though somewhat cunning, and withal, capable of croaking in a tolerable voice, and is less disagreeable than most of his family connexions. Our country, to believe him, is assuredly ruined; the altars of religion are all desecrated; pestilential heresies are rife in the land; Socinians and Jews, and even Unbelievers, vote, and are sometimes voted for; and the awful visitations of God's wrath cannot be delayed much longer. One may almost fancy him a second Jonah, lately disgorged from some whale's belly, come to denounce divine judgments upon another Nineveh. The good people of America, it is devoutly hoped, may take warning and repent, ere the "forty days" be run out.

The sum of all his complaints is, he tells us, "that one way or another, that religion, which has given us a name among the states of Christendom, and which many of us deem essential to our future well-being, as a people, is everywhere *politically set at nought*; regarded as an outlaw to the institutions of the country; a feather in the scale of its interests; as useless, if not discreditable in public life; and in reference to the elective sovereignty itself not to be thought of!" Surely this is a grievous complaint. But on what facts does the author rest for its justification? And what kind of political recognition of religion does he demand?

The facts, which justify the complaint, and prove all here set forth, are: 1st. President Jefferson refused to appoint a fast when some of his political opponents wanted one, for the purpose of fasting over some of

his political sins, and alleged in his own defence, that he could not find any power delegated to him by the constitution of the United States, authorizing him to interfere with religious doctrines, institutions, discipline, or exercise. 2dly. The refusal on the part of General Jackson to appoint a fast, to keep off the cholera, when certain religious people requested him to do it. 3dly. The assertion of a United States Senator, that a reference to the Bible, in the Senate, as authority, was not fortunate, that book not being the statute book of that body. 4thly. The refusal on the part of Congress to stop the Mail from running on Sunday. 5thly. The fact, that the New York Legislature, during its last session, refused to appoint a chaplain. 6thly. The fact, that the Legislature of pious Connecticut debated the question, whether they would not do the same. 7thly. Electors do not inquire whether candidates for office are orthodox or not, and orthodox electors do sometimes vote for anti-orthodox, or heterodox candidates.

These are the facts which justify his complaint, and authorize him to call our government an irreligious one. What would he have as a remedy for the evil? What kind of connexion between religion and politics does he demand? A union of church and state? No; that is not to be thought of. Have the state become the servant of the church? Most likely; but he does not say so. Have the state decree a body of Divinity, which all must embrace, a ritual all must observe? No. What then? Enact that the Bible is the holy word of God; that no man who does not profess to believe it shall be eligible to any office; that to deny the existence of God, the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, or the inspiration of the Old and New Testaments, is blasphemy, to be punished as a criminal offence; to prohibit by strong penal enactments all profane swearing, and all sabbath-breaking, and to appoint fasts whenever the clergy or the church say the occasion demands them.

The author of the book contends that ours is a

Christian commonwealth, and therefore infers that all which comes or may come under the denomination of Christian ethics should be legally enforced. He divides Christianity into two parts, *Ecclesiastical Christianity* and the *Ethics* of Christianity. The first belongs exclusively to the church, which is a body distinct from all civil polity, and raised infinitely above the reach of the civil legislature; it asks and will submit to no civil protection or control. The ethics of Christianity are binding on legislatures, and are proper objects of legislation; it is the duty of civil governments to respect them and to cause them to be respected.

That the government of this country is a Christian government, is inferred from the fact, that in no case is it positively declared not to be. The constitution of the United States repudiates some of the abuses of Christianity, but says nothing against Christianity itself. The first settlers of this country were Christians, and in nearly all cases designed to found a Christian commonwealth, and did found one. Nearly all the state constitutions originally recognised Christianity, and the greater part of them do it even now. Christianity is part and parcel of the common law of England, [doubted,] which was brought here by our fathers, and which is still in force. The majority are Christians; and as the majority have an absolute right to rule, it follows that they have a right to form a Christian commonwealth, and to insist upon Christianity as the religion of the government. Moreover, in practice, the government in all its branches, saving the cases of Presidents Jefferson and Jackson, the majority of the committee on Sabbath mails, the New York legislature, in dispensing with a chaplain, has always recognised Christianity, and respected it as the religion of the country.

Ours being a Christian commonwealth, it follows that our government must regard Christian ethics as its own, and that it can have no right to introduce Pagan, Jewish, or Mahometan ethics; and it also

follows that none but Christians can really be citizens or members of the commonwealth. Governments are instituted to protect rights, not to create them; and its mission is to protect the rights of all its citizens. For this end the American government was instituted. It was instituted by Christians to nurse and maintain their rights as Christians. Christians did not institute it for Unbelievers, Socinians, and Jews, but for themselves. Its functionaries are then under no obligation to consult the prejudices, beliefs, or pretended consciences of these. These have no rights in a Christian commonwealth; and if they choose to live in one must take up with such franchises as Christians choose to grant them.

This, then, is the amount of freedom secured to us, or designed to be secured to us, by our boasted free institutions. It is freedom to Christians but to none others. The people here comprise not the whole population, but the Christian majority. Christians are the favored class. The rest are out of the pale of citizenship, are denied to have any rights, and are reduced to virtual slavery, liable at any moment to be prosecuted and punished as criminals. This is the doctrine of a professed Christian, and of a pretended friend of liberty! After avowing this doctrine, he has the effrontery to say Christianity is favorable to liberty! So is Christianity favorable to liberty, but not such Christianity, not such liberty as this.

The pretence set up by some religious people, that our government is a Christian government, that our commonwealths are Christian commonwealths, deserves more than a passing notice. Mischief lurks beneath it. If it be sustained, we undergo a revolution and must bid farewell to liberty. The several states or commonwealths, which form the confederacy of the United States, are not Christian commonwealths, in the sense in which our author and those who think with him, contend they are. The design of our fathers, when first landing in this country, was not to found a Christian commonwealth. The idea that

brought them here was liberty, still more than it was religion. Their dominant idea was freedom. They wanted, and they aimed to establish, a free commonwealth. They may not have fully possessed their idea, they may not have generalized it to the extent it will bear, but nevertheless they have it from the first moment fermenting in them.

The age, in which the colonies were planted, was an age in which all great ideas appeared in a theological envelope. Our fathers wanted liberty. This was their first want. But they had no conception of a liberty worth having, not founded on justice. In this they were right. Liberty is derived from justice. But justice, in their minds, was Christianity, and Christianity was their theology and church polity. Hence the reason why Christianity held the place it did in the commonwealths they founded. Their mistake was a natural one, an inevitable one in their age. It consisted merely in taking their notions of Christian ethics as their measure of natural right, instead of taking, as we do, man's innate sense of natural right, as the proper measure of Christian ethics. If they disfranchised all but Christians, it was not because they sought to found a commonwealth for Christians alone, but because they regarded all who were not Christians, either as having not as yet risen to man's estate, or as having forfeited their rights as men, and fallen into the class of the guilty. They did not know, did not admit, that men were men, and possessed of all the rights of men, though opposed to the Christian faith, and they made that crime, which is not crime; but they did not do this to secure a monopoly to those who professed to be Christians, but to secure a liberty supported on justice, an order of government founded on their highest idea of Right, and maintaining it in the state.

That the real idea of our fathers was liberty, that liberty was the dominant idea of the institutions they founded, is evident from the history of these institutions. The institutions of a nation rarely if ever

receive a new idea. The history of the nation is but the history of the practical development of the ideas with which it starts. A theocracy can never grow naturally into a government in which the interests of man are paramount to all others ; a monarchy never softens down into an aristocracy, especially not into a democracy. The old nation is destroyed, and a new one takes its place, whenever a change similar to any of these is observed to occur. The natural growth of a nation is the natural unfolding of the ideas with which it begins its career. If theocracy had been the dominant idea of our fathers, if their leading design had been to found Christian commonwealths, then the natural growth of our institutions would have manifested this idea, this design, more and more clearly. But instead of this, the idea of liberty, of the rights of man, is the idea which has been gradually unfolding itself from our institutions. Every advance, every change has tended to bring out this idea. The tendency from the first has been to prune away whatever conceals the majesty of man or overshadows his rights. Church membership was at first made a prerequisite to citizenship, because at first it was thought none others were really men. But this is no longer the case, because we have ascertained that individuals, who are not church members, may be men. Property qualifications for the exercise of the right of suffrage have, in most cases, been abandoned ; for it has been ascertained that a man has rights, though he have not property ; religious tests have been dispensed with, not because the people have become less religious, but because it has been found that religious tests are inconsistent with the rights of man. In every case of amendment to our state constitutions, the idea of the rights of man has been brought out more clearly, and liberty extended or surrounded with new guarantees. This fact is decisive. It proves that freedom, not religion, is the dominant idea of our institutions. Our commonwealths are free commonwealths, rather

than Christian commonwealths. Their genius is liberty, not Christianity, *anthropocratic*, if we may use the term, not theocratic.

Now, should we find in our institutions certain provisions favorable to a theocracy, — which we take it is what is meant by a Christian commonwealth, in the sense the term is used by this author and his friends, — we must regard them as exceptions, anomalies, which are not yet brought under the general rule, not as indications of their real character and design. All these provisions must be interpreted in favor of liberty, — as much in accordance with the genius of our institutions as they will bear. The fact, that the author finds some such provisions in the constitutions and laws of the several states, is not, and should not be regarded by him as a proof, that our commonwealths are Christian commonwealths, in his sense of the term; but merely as a proof, that many of our ideas are yet in their theological envelope, and that we have not brought all our constitutional and statutory provisions into perfect keeping with our great, our dominant, idea of liberty.

Assuming then, as we do, that the great idea, the genius, of our government, is that of a government instituted for nourishing and maintaining the rights of man, we deny that a Christian, as such, has any preëminence over any other man. We speak now of Christianity as a positive system of religion, a positive institution. In this sense Christianity is younger than man. Man existed in all his integrity and with all his rights as a man, before it was instituted. His rights as a man are older than his claims as a Christian. They are not derived from Christianity, they are not dependent on Christianity; then their enjoyment and exercise cannot be made to rest, under a government which professes to recognise and is bound to maintain them, on the fact of embracing Christianity. Give Christianity, or take it away, man and his rights remain the same. Governments, then, that are instituted for the purpose ours are, have pre-

cisely the same rights to recognise and maintain in the case of him who is not a Christian, as in the case of him who is. If there are any provisions in the constitutions and laws of our several states in opposition to this, they are inconsistencies, incongruities, made null and void, in justice, by the genius of our institutions.

It behooves professed Christians to beware how they controvert this position. On what ground will they do it? On what ground will a man pretend that he has a right to be a Christian, if he denies to his brother the right not to be one? The right of any one to be a Christian can be legitimated only by the admission of that more general right of every man to choose his own religion. And, as religion is in all cases a matter of opinion, of belief, the right of a man to choose his own form of religion can be legitimated only by admitting a right still more general, that of the entire liberty of every man to form and express his own opinions. This last right is virtually recognised and secured in those constitutional provisions which guaranty us the freedom of speech and the press. The greater always includes the less. It would be absurd to admit that we have the liberty to propagate by speech or by the press our opinions, whatever they may be, and yet to deny us the right to form our opinions by the free action of our own understandings.

The Christian claims protection under our government, not by virtue of the fact, that he is a Christian, but by virtue of the fact that he is a man, and because it is one of the rights of man to be protected in the peaceable enjoyment of his religious belief. If he withhold this right from another, if he prohibit another from the free enjoyment of his religious belief, then he denies that this right to the enjoyment of one's own religious belief is one of the rights of man. In doing this, he denies his own right as a man to be a Christian, and bases his right to protection in his religious faith on mere accident, on the

accident that he lives under a government favorable to his views, or that he has the good fortune to be of the majority. But, if he claim his protection on the ground that he is a man, and ought not to be molested in his belief, then his plea is equally good for every other man, whatever may be that other man's belief.

Lay down the rule that government has a right to protect one belief in preference to another, or to make any exceptions to a man in any case on account of his belief, and where shall we stop? If the state may declare it necessary to believe in a God in order to be a citizen with all the rights and immunities of a citizen, then it may declare what God must be believed in, whether it must be the Hindoo God, the Greek and Roman God, the Jewish God, the Mahometan God, the Catholic God, the Calvinistic God, the Materialist's God, or the Spiritualist's God. If it may do this, it may do more. It may declare the Bible to be the word of God; and if this, still more; it may determine the interpretation that may be put upon the Bible; it may decide whether the Trinitarian or the Unitarian commentators shall be the orthodox commentators, whom it is lawful to read. In fine, once begin, there is no stopping place, this side of absolute religious despotism. Is our author in favor of this? O no. The doctrines of religion belong to the church, and the state may not meddle with them. What then? He merely asks that Christians be protected in their religion. What, protected in the enjoyment of their religion, as all men are protected in their opinions? If this be all, he asks nothing unreasonable; but he asks what he already has. This, however, is not all. He asks as a Christian to be protected in his religion, not only so far as concerns his own freedom of professing it, but also in preventing any body from opposing it. He thinks it a grievous wrong that in this country, where the majority are Christians, he must submit to hear the truth and sacredness of that religion, he embraces and reveres, questioned and even ridiculed. He wishes not

that any body should be required by law to believe it, but merely that nobody shall be permitted by law to oppose it, and that whoever does oppose it shall not only be without note, but also without civil rights in the commonwealth.

Very well. On what grounds does he make this modest demand? Is what he asks one of the rights of man? Does he claim it on the ground that he is a man, and therefore has a right to profess his faith without being opposed or questioned? If so, his plea is equally available in the case of any one who adopts a different faith. If the atheist may not question his faith in God, then may he not question the atheist's faith in No-God. If the disbeliever in the inspiration of the Old and New Testments may not speak against his belief in that inspiration, what right has he to speak against disbelief in it? If he have a right to demand that the legislature decree it blasphemy to deny the doctrine of the Trinity, the Unitarian has an equal right to demand that it decree it blasphemy to assert it. Will our author do as he would be done by, treat the beliefs and disbeliefs of others as he would have his own treated? Not at all. He wants a preference shown to himself and all of his way of thinking. Very well, we say again. But we beseech him to tell us on what ground he legitimates his right to the preference he demands. Not on the simple ground that he is a man, for all men are equal as men, and he must give what he asks to receive, and this excludes all idea of preference. On what ground then? That his faith is true, and therefore must not be opposed? But they, who oppose him, say his faith is false, and therefore ought in justice to truth and Humanity to be opposed. Why shall the government credit him rather than them?

But our author claims this preference to his faith, because it is the faith of the majority. The majority are Christians; and as the majority have a right to rule, they have a right to enact that their religion shall be respected as the religion of the country,

which may not be lawfully denied. But will he admit the soundness of this argument? We ask why the majority have any more right to decree that their religion is the religion of the land, than the minority have to decree the same thing of theirs? We should like to know why a man has any more right to have his religion respected, because he is in the majority, than he would have, if he were in the minority? Are the rights of man matters dependent on the will of the majority? Does one's rights as a man vary as he chances to be in the majority or in the minority? What may be one's rights to-day, then, may not be one's rights to-morrow, for majorities may change.

Our author, we presume, is a Christian as he understands Christianity. There are countries in which Christianity is in a feeble minority. Suppose our author should have his lot cast in one of those countries, would he think that it would be wrong for him to profess his religion there, or that it would be right, if born there, that he should not be permitted the freedom of the commonwealth, because the majority embraced a religion different from his own? Jesus and the Apostles were once a small minority, a little band with the whole world against them. Were they justified in opposing the religious notions of the majority? and were those Roman laws wise and just, which required the early Christians to respect the pagan Gods? Luther and Calvin were in a small minority; they denounced the religion of the majority. Were they right, or were they wrong? The author has arraigned the report of the majority of the committee of Congress on Sunday Mails. As that report was the report of the majority, would our author, had he been on that committee, have deemed himself justified in making a minority report against it? Had he been in Congress at the time, would he have spoken against it, in the minority, as he would have been? Nay, was he not there? and did he not make a speech there against the opinions of the majority of the House? This book reminds us very

much of a certain speech made on the occasion by a distinguished Senator from New Jersey, who, for aught we know may be its author. But what right would he have had to say anything against the opinions of the majority? If the majority have a right to prohibit all speech against their opinions, the rule is absolute; and it applies to the majority of a committee, or of Congress, as well as to any other majority. Will the author follow his doctrine to this, its logical result? If not, where will he stop? Why stop there, rather than somewhere else?

We have spoken of the rights of man. Now the rights of man go with man wherever he goes. He does not acquire them by being in the majority, nor does he forfeit them by falling into the minority. The Christian has a right to be protected in his honest belief, and in the peaceable exercise of his religion, because this is one of the rights of man. Faith and worship are individual matters; and so long as they are not made pretexts for injuring the rights of others, the individual has a perfect right to enjoy them. It is the grossest tyranny, either by legislative enactments or by public opinion, to make him suffer for them. If the Christian has the right, as a man, to defend his honest belief, the Deist, the Jew, the Atheist must have the same right. A law making it criminal to disavow faith in God, in the Scriptures, or in the Trinity, is as much an infringement upon the rights of man, as a law making it criminal to profess to believe either one or the other. If one man has as much right to avow atheism as another has theism, one must have as much right to speak against theism as the other has against atheism. If the majority to-day have a right to decree that Christianity is the religion of the country, and to make it criminal to speak against it, it may decree, if it choose, the reverse to-morrow. If the majority have the absolute right to rule, it has the same right to make a law against asserting the existence of a God, that it has against denying his existence. All which our infi-

dels want then to justify them in making strong penal enactments against Christianity, is merely to become the majority. Has our author thought of this?

Christianity itself is decidedly against this author. It recognises the great brotherhood of men, and teaches that all are equal. It teaches this when it commands us to do unto others as we would have others do unto us. This command can be legitimated only on the ground that man is everywhere equal to man. Man being everywhere equal to man, it follows that whatever it is proper for one man to do by another, it is proper that other should do by him. Men are men, whatever their beliefs. The respect one claims for his belief, he must show to the belief of others. This is the Christian law. Our author as a Christian is bound to obey it. As he would have infidels treat his belief, so let him treat theirs then. If he does this, how can he demand the preference to be shown to his faith by the government, which he has pointed out, and on which he so earnestly insists?

The writer falls into the common mistake in relation to liberty of conscience. He thinks he has a right to enjoy liberty of conscience, and that his conscience, as a Christian, should be respected. Is he not correct, justifiable in this? But he forgets that other men have consciences as well as he, and that government is as much bound to respect their consciences as his. He forgets that to construe one's own liberty of conscience, so as to interfere with another's liberty of conscience, is to misconstrue it.

We hold to liberty of conscience. Conscience we regard as the supreme law, for the individual, in all cases whatsoever. It is more ultimate than the *lex scripta*, than the *lex non scripta*, of paramount authority to all creeds, confessions, rituals, dictates of fashion, public opinion, or decrees of the majority. It is to the individual, the voice of God, which he may not disregard without sin, and which he is bound to follow, though it lead to reproach, poverty, the dungeon, the scaffold, or the cross. But by the very fact,

that we recognise the supremacy of the individual conscience, we necessarily restrict the sphere of its supremacy to the individual himself. Conscience cannot be divided against itself. Consequently the persuasion one may have, which would lead him to force or restrain the exercise of conscience in another, can never be conscience. The liberty of conscience in each individual must then be always so construed as to leave an equal liberty in every other individual. They pervert conscience, who make it the plea for exercising a control over others, which they will not suffer others to exercise over them. One's conscience leads him to observe the Sabbath. It is well. Let him obey his conscience. But let him at the same time remember that he must not impose his conscience on another. That other has a conscience of his own, which is his supreme law.

Our author we suppose would, in part, admit this. But he does it on the ground, that unbelievers have no conscience. We shall not dispute this ground. We should prefer to question, whether he who assumes it has a conscience or not. The man who really supposes that unbelievers are destitute of moral feelings and moral judgments, or who supposes them in general less conscientious than Christians, has no right to set himself up as one capable of instructing the commonwealth. If he assert it without seriously believing it, what is his own conscience worth? Unbelievers are to be compassionated because they want that serenity of soul, that inward repose which faith alone can give; but we are never to suppose them necessarily more deficient in the moral qualities of human nature than the rest of mankind. Indeed, in the majority of instances, we presume, the unbeliever is so called, because he has more faith than his neighbors. We shall make little progress in the work of converting unbelievers to Christianity, till we learn that they are men, to be respected and loved as brothers. The arguments which will convince their understandings, or win their hearts, are not those which

exclude them from the freedom of the commonwealth, and deny them to be human beings. Christianity is most grievously wronged when we make it the pretext for imposing on others burdens, which we would not submit to have others impose on us. Jesus wept with unbelievers, and died on the cross that they might have faith in man and in God. It was in enduring, not in inflicting, legal penalties, that the early Christians arrested the attention of the world, and prepared the way for its conversion.

"Our fathers," says this author, "had no conception of some of the modern notions of what are called state-rights; and I believe they would have stood amazed at the kind of suggestion now current in the country, that a government, such as they have left us, so respectful of the rights of man, ought yet to be administered with as little avowed deference as possible for those of the Supreme Being." What is meant by the rights of the Supreme Being? Are governments instituted for God, or for man? Is it their especial province to guard the rights of God? Does God stand in need of human governments, and look to them for protection? God is his own guardian, his own avenger. He asks no aid of man, no human arm to be raised in his defence. But suppose it not so, we would ask, how can we better respect his rights than by protecting those of his children? If we have studied Christianity to any purpose, it teaches us that we serve and honor God by loving and serving his children, our brethren.

Our author contends that we ought to respect Christianity legally, politically, because Christianity is favorable to liberty. If he means by this that our laws should be enacted and administered in accordance with the great principles of justice, meekness, and love, which constitute the essence of Christianity, assuredly we have no controversy with him. We contend earnestly, in season and out of season, for the same. But if he means that Christianity is to be recognised legally, politically, in its character of a

positive religion, we do not agree with him. Religion is an individual concernment. It is what there is most intimate and holy in man. Governments have no right to interfere with it. They must put off their shoes when they approach it, and stand in awe before it, as Moses did before the Burning Bush. Its place is in the interior sanctuary of the individual heart, where it should be screened from all human observation, save as it manifests itself through a sweet and gentle, a just and beneficent life.

Christianity, no doubt, forms the moral sense of this community, and therefore should always be consulted by government and its functionaries; but it is Christianity only as the religious name for what we usually term natural morality, or in its broadest sense, natural right. In this sense, nearly all men embrace it, and all desire to have it respected. But to conclude from this to legal and political sanctions, either to the dogmas or discipline of Christianity, as a positive system of religion and ethics, though our author does it, is bad logic. He concludes from this, if we understand him, though he says not so in just so many words, that the denial of the existence of God, of the inspiration of the Bible, profane swearing, and sabbath-breaking, should be deemed offences against the peace of the community. Here is his error. He will find few atheists or deists, who will question the Gospel morality, or who will differ with him in any rational interpretation of natural justice. The moral worth of men, so far as regards their actions towards one another, is not to be judged of by their faith, or their want of faith, in moral or religious codes. Unbelievers, saving the positive duties of the church, are, in general, as good Christians as Christians themselves. They have as warm a love for man, take as much interest in the progress of man and society, are as honest, as upright, as conscientious, as believers. They are no more immoral, unless conventionalism be called morality, than any other class of the community. The charge of licentiousness brought against

them, if understood to mean licentiousness in regard to natural morality, or even the moral precepts of the Gospel, cannot be sustained.

The error of our author, and those who agree with him, is in confounding *natural* and *positive* morality. Natural morality is that which is founded in human nature, and is the same wherever man is; positive morality rests merely on arbitrary authority, and varies with time and place. The former is immutable, save that it is more fully comprehended in proportion as civilization advances; the latter varies with the opinions, fashions, and usages of different ages and countries. The one comes from within, the other from without. The first is developed, the last is imposed. Now the first is the only morality that may be legitimately recognised by government. All legislation in this country has reference to it, and professes to aim at its realization. So far as this morality is concerned, and this is Christian morality, — the Gospel being, as Bishop Butler well remarks, only a republication of the law of nature, — all men of whatever sect, party, or religion, agree that it may and should be legally and politically recognised. The dispute is in reference to the positive morality. Positive morality, as our author understands it, acknowledges no man to be moral, who does not admit the existence of God, the inspiration of the Old and New Testaments, and the doctrine of the Trinity; who does not keep the Sabbath holy, refrain from profane swearing, and maintain some form or other of public worship. The several moral qualifications here implied he requires in every candidate for office, and all these are to be enjoined and enforced by law, not under plea of maintaining religion, but that of maintaining morality. He wishes every man, who does any one of the things here prohibited, or neglects any one here enjoined, to be declared by law an offender against the peace of the commonwealth, and punishable as such. And he alleges that he and his friends cannot enjoy their rights of conscience,

unless it be so. Now, if he will reflect a moment, that all these injunctions are injunctions of positive, not of natural morality, resting upon an arbitrary authority for their obligation, he must see that they cannot be legally recognised and enforced, without denying all freedom of opinion. Whether they have anything to do with real worth of character or not, is a matter of opinion. They are not felt to be universally obligatory. This man may contend for them, that one may oppose them. I may believe that I ought to be just and merciful, to do no harm, and to do all the good I can, and I may labor to be true to my faith; yet I may regard all this positive morality as of no binding force, and think that I am at liberty to observe it or not, according to my own convictions. Bring in the government now with its positive law, and it reduces me to slavery. If it may command me to observe the first day of the week as holy time, it may enjoin any religious observance it pleases. If it may forbid me to labor on that day, if it may command me to attend church on that day, it may tell me on what days of the week I shall plough my ground, what days hoe my corn; indeed prescribe to me every act of my life, I am permitted to do, and the time and manner of doing it. The same may be said of all the other particulars specified.

The only safe rule is for government to confine itself to natural morality, and leave positive morality to every one's own conscience. They who believe in the Trinity ought to be protected in the enjoyment and expression of their belief; they who do not believe it, should have full liberty to oppose it. So of all other matters of belief. They who regard the first day of the week as holy should have the right to keep it holy; but not, as they claim to have, the right to force those to keep it holy who do not regard it as holy. They who reverence the Bible should have full liberty to reverence it, but no authority from government to exact reverence from those who do not believe it worthy of reverence. It may hurt the

feelings of Christians to hear it spoken against, and so may it hurt the feelings of unbelievers to hear their favorite books spoken against; and if it be blasphemy to hurt the feelings of the one, there is no reason in the world why it should not be blasphemy to hurt the feelings of the other. If the Christian demands a law prohibiting unbelievers from reviling his sacred books, he must submit to a law prohibiting him from reviling the sacred books of unbelievers. He has not always done this. He has said as hard and as malignant things against the Age of Reason, as believers in the Age of Reason have ever said against believers in the Bible.

We are aware that this rule, so far as government is concerned, places men of all opinions on a par, and gives the Christian no legal or political advantage over the infidel. Shall the Christian object to this? Shall the Christian ask for a legal and political advantage over his unbelieving brother? Has he not God and truth on his side, and is not this advantage enough? Has he not also the majority, fashion, public opinion on his side; all the schools and colleges and most of the means of influence in his hands; and does he ask for more? Shall the Christian intimate that he is unwilling to meet the infidel on equal terms? Let him blush then to call himself a Christian. *He* is the infidel who wants faith in Reason, and fears to trust it.

It is often alleged that atheism is incompatible with the stability of government, and the peace and welfare of the community, and may therefore be punished as an offence. We have not the space to enter far into the matter involved in this statement. We hold that no government can have any right to maintain itself by the sacrifice of private right. The powers of government are not made up from the individual rights surrendered to it. The notion that individuals give up a portion of their natural rights to society, in order to secure protection for the remainder, is a false notion. Government is not a contract, a bargain. It

rests on Divine Right. The *Jus Divinum* must be reasserted, if there be any government to be maintained. The magistrate is ordained of God. Define the legitimate powers of government, and those powers are sacred, and are derived from God. But as they are derived from God, they can never be in opposition to individual rights, which are also derived from God. If then we have established the fact, that a man has a natural right to profess atheism, the consequences of professing it, to the government, be they what they may, can never invalidate one's right to profess it. The good of the community may be consulted and ought to be; but only in harmony with the good of each part. The greatest good of the greatest number is not the end to be sought, but the greatest good of the whole. The few may never be sacrificed to secure the safety and well-being of the many. No individual, however lowly, may be overlooked. No individual can ever be without significance; and whenever the rights of one individual are disregarded, be the end what it may, the rights of every individual and of the whole community are invaded.

But let this pass. Atheism, we deny to be dangerous to communities, and we might quote as high authority for our assertion as that of Lord Bacon, but that we are not much given to quotations. An atheistical community cannot be found. The history of our race contains the record of no such community. Mankind almost universally regard the atheist with horror. This horror, which we naturally feel at the denial of God, and the declaration of our own orphanage, is a sufficient protection against the spread of atheism. If it were a seducing doctrine, one, to the profession of which there were many and strong temptations, then it might, perhaps, be necessary to consider whether we have the right to suppress it. It has hitherto been rarely if ever professed for its own sake, but because it has been a refuge from oppression. Men oppressed, despoiled of their possessions

and their rights, overwhelmed with the weight of tyrannical kings, nobilities, and hierarchies, professing to reign in the name of God, and by divine ordination, have sought relief in atheism, and denied God, that they might shake off a tyranny which had become too grievous to be borne. Give the atheist perfect liberty to profess his atheism, take away from him the conviction that in professing it he is warring against an arrogant authority, and he will himself be disgusted with it, and no longer have any wish to profess it. When men are permitted to see in God a father, they have no disposition to deny him; and when they see belief in him drawing mankind together as brothers, they will love that belief and do their best to acquire it.*

Similar remarks may be made in regard to sabbath-keeping and attendance on public worship. The first question is always, whether the government have a right to enforce them? The Sabbath, it is said, should be kept holy, but they only will keep it holy who believe it to be holy time, law or no law; — and they who believe it to be holy time will keep it holy,

* It may also be remarked, that society depends not on religion for its subsistence, but on the social instincts of human nature. Man lives in society, not because he has a religion, but because he is man, and is created with a social nature. The instinct of society is a primitive, not a secondary instinct. It is not a result of a belief in God, nor of any other belief. Men have not reasoned themselves into society; they have not said to themselves, Let us create society. They have always lived in society. Society is as old as man himself. God, in giving us social instincts, social affections, and cravings, which society alone can satisfy, has amply provided for its subsistence. If men would believe more in God, and understand a little more of human nature, and rely less on their positive creeds, they would have fewer fears of the disastrous effects of the propagation of error. He, who really believes in God, believes that the Power which controls all worlds and events is mightier than any false opinion. They who think a little heterodoxy can bring the world to an end, or essentially alter its course, who fear that it can dissolve society, and prevent men from uniting with one another, be they called what they may, or profess they what faith they will, are the genuine infidels, the real atheists, against whom the friends of religion should be most on their guard, and against whom, if against any, laws of blasphemy should be enacted and enforced.

although not legally enjoined. They who believe in the propriety of public worship, and who would profit by attendance on it, will attend it, if they can. They who do not believe in its propriety, and have no relish for it, would not worship, though compelled to attend the places of worship. Religious worship, to be acceptable, must be free and sincere. If it be not offered freely, from the spontaneous promptings of the heart, it can have no worth. All laws, having for their object the enforcement of religion, or a respect for its ordinances, are therefore useless in the case of those who are religious, and can only produce hypocrisy in the case of those who are not. And hypocrisy, in our estimation, is a much more heinous sin in the sight of God, than sabbath-breaking, or neglect of public worship.

We have spoken, as we have, from no indifference to religion or to its ordinances, but from the overflowings of our zeal for Christian freedom. We would by no means encourage atheism, sabbath-breaking, non-attendance on public worship, or the habit of elevating to office men deficient in high moral and religious worth. But we are convinced that the best way to secure belief in the existence of God, reverence for religion, its ordinances, and the practice of the Christian virtues, is for Christians to be just, to respect all the rights of man, and to attempt to secure no legal or political advantages to themselves. We would leave religion perfectly free, and rely solely on arguments addressed to the reason and the conscience for its maintenance and prosperity.

The disposition on the part of churchmen to arrogate to themselves rights, they will not concede to others, the practice believers indulge of denouncing unbelievers, treating them with bitterness, scorn, and contempt, of ridiculing their notions and their writings, publishing from the pulpit and the press gross exaggerations of their doctrines, and utter falsehoods about their personal characters, the low and vulgar rank to which they seek to sink them in the social scale, and

their unwillingness to respect them for what is just and true in their doctrines and characters, may be set down among the chief causes of existing indifference to religion, and the spreading infidelity, which every true Christian deplores ; and till the church become Christianized, and professed Christians imbibe the spirit and follow the example of their Master, it will be of little avail to demand laws against unbelievers and sabbath-breakers, to speak against infidels, or to labor for their conversion.

- ART. III. — SUB-TREASURY BILL. — 1. *Mr. Webster's Speech on the Currency. Delivered in the Senate of the United States. Sept. 28, 1837.*
2. *Speech of Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina, on the Sub-Treasury Bill. Delivered in the Senate of the United States, Feb. 15, 1838.*
3. *Mr. Webster's Second Speech on the Sub-Treasury Bill. Delivered in the Senate of the United States, March 12, 1838.*
4. *Speech of Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina, in reply to Mr. Clay, on the Sub-Treasury Bill. Delivered in the Senate of the United States, March 10, 1838.*
5. *Speech of Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina, in reply to Mr. Webster, on the Sub-Treasury Bill. Delivered in the Senate of the United States, March 22, 1838.*

WE regard the Sub-Treasury Bill as one of the most important measures which our government has proposed since its organization. It constitutes now, and will probably, for some time to come, the great question in Federal politics. Its adoption or rejection will have an immense bearing on our whole future history. We believe, therefore, it may be well to devote a few pages to the consideration of the principal arguments for it, and chief objections against it.

The principle of the Sub-Treasury Bill is simply that of providing for collecting, safe-keeping, and disbursing the public revenues without recourse to Banks. We shall not trouble ourselves or our readers with the details of the Bill. They are, we presume, in the main satisfactory; for we have heard little or nothing said against them. The principle of the Bill is all that we feel much interest in; it is all the friends of the Bill are very tenacious of, and all its enemies very strenuously oppose. To the principle of the Bill, as we have stated it, shall we, therefore, confine the greater portion of the remarks we have to offer.

It may be assumed in the outset, that the government has the right to collect, keep, and disburse its revenues, by means of its own officers, without any recourse to bank agency. It may also be assumed that the banks have no natural claim on the government to be employed as its fiscal agents, and that they will have no injustice to complain of, if they are not so employed. Moreover, it may be assumed again, that the government can, if it choose, manage its fiscal concerns without any connexion with banks or banking institutions. Banks are a contrivance of yesterday; but governments are older than history, older even than tradition; and there can be no doubt that they had fiscal concerns, which they managed, and in some instances very well too, a considerable time before banks were dreamed of. What has been done may be done. The question, then, on the side we are now viewing it, is one of expediency. Is it expedient for the government to dispense with banks, and all bank agency, in the management of its fiscal concerns?

Our government, in its measures and practical character, should conform as strictly as possible to the ideal or theory of our institutions. Nobody, we trust, is prepared for a revolution; nobody, we also trust, is bold enough to avow a wish to depart very widely from the fundamental principles of our insti-

tutions; and everybody will admit that the statesman should study to preserve those institutions in their simplicity and integrity, and should seek, in every law or measure he proposes, merely to bring out their practical worth, and secure the ends for which they were established. Their spirit should dictate every legislative enactment, every judicial decision, and every executive measure. Any law not in harmony with their genius, any measure which would be likely to disturb the nicely adjusted balance of their respective powers, or that would give them, in their practical operation, a character essentially different from the one they were originally intended to have, should be discountenanced, and never for a single moment entertained.

We would not be understood to be absolutely opposed to all innovations or changes, whatever their character. It is true, we can never consent to disturb the settled order of a state, without strong and urgent reasons; but we can conceive of cases in which we should deem it our duty to demand a revolution. When a government has outlived its idea, and the institutions of a country no longer bear any relation to the prevailing habits, thoughts, and sentiments of the people, and have become a mere dead carcass, an encumbrance, an offence, we can call loudly for a revolution, and behold with comparative coolness its terrible doings. But such a case does not as yet present itself here. Our institutions are all young, full of life and the future. Here, we cannot be revolutionists. Here, we can tolerate no innovations, no changes, which touch fundamental laws. None are admissible but such as are needed to preserve our institutions in their original character, to bring out their concealed beauty, to clear the field for their free operation, and to give more directness and force to their legitimate activity. Every measure must be in harmony with them, grow as it were out of them, and be but a development of their fundamental laws.

The government of the United States is a congress rather than a government. It is not instituted for the ordinary purposes of government, but for a few, and comparatively a very few, special purposes. The ordinary rules for interpreting the powers of government can be applied to it only to a limited extent, and even then with great caution. The principal governments of the country, according to the theory of American institutions, are the State governments. These were intended to be the governments for the people in all their civil, municipal, domestic, and individual interests and relations. The Federal government was designed merely to take charge of the external relations of the confederated States with foreign nations, and, to a certain extent, with one another. It was never intended to be a government affecting the private interests of the people, as individual citizens. It in fact repudiates every measure which would make it a great central government, giving law to the States, or which tends to give it a direct or indirect control over the private fortunes and affairs of the people; and it can own only such measures as tend to keep it within its province, to preserve its original idea, and enable it to discharge its legitimate functions.

Undoubtedly the Federal government may take such measures, though they affect the private fortunes and relations of individual citizens, as are *necessary* to the exercise of its delegated powers. But they must be necessary, not merely convenient. The rule always to be observed is, the Federal government must touch the individual citizen as seldom and as lightly as possible, consistently with the faithful discharge of its constitutional duties. Should two measures be proposed for accomplishing a constitutional end, one of which has very little bearing on individual citizens, leaving them almost entire freedom, the other connecting the government intimately with all the business of the country, and bringing it into a close relation with every individual citizen; the

first ought to be adopted instead of the last, although the last might be the more feasible of the two, and likely to be attended with more beneficial results. What may not be consulted openly and done directly, must never be consulted covertly, and done indirectly. We must avoid, as far as practicable, all incidental action of the government,—and that too, when it promises to be useful as well as when it threatens to be injurious.

These principles, we believe are sound. We do not mean to say that some persons may not be found who will controvert them; for there are persons to be found who do not very well comprehend the relations, which were originally established between the Federal government and the State governments, and who have a strong desire to make the Federal government the supreme government of the country. But they are the only principles we can adopt, if we mean to avoid the charge of being revolutionists, and to preserve our institutions in their real character; if we mean to preserve to the States, as we ought, the main business of government, and to restrict the Federal government in its action to the special purposes for which it was originally instituted.

Yet these principles have been departed from. The Federal government, in point of fact, has become the supreme government of the land. It is no longer a congress for regulating our relations with foreigners, for adjusting the intercourse of the states with one another, and providing for the general defence; but it has become a grand central government, affecting, by its measures, individual interests and relations more powerfully than the action of the State governments themselves. The people, at least a large and influential portion of them, have come to regard it as the supreme government. They think of it as such; speak of it as such; commend it as such; condemn it as such. All eyes turn towards it. Do capitalists want to change their mode of investment, Congress must provide for the change; do their profits turn

out to be less than their wishes, Congress must raise the tariff of duties to make them greater. Is there distress in the money market, commercial embarrassment, the Federal government has caused it; are our factories closed, ships hauled up to rot, industry paralyzed, and the laborer seeking in vain for employment, the Federal government is in fault, and Congress must afford relief.

Federal politics, too, absorb State politics. State legislators vote on a bill for the organization of a primary school, or for constructing or repairing a bridge, according to their opinions on a bill before Congress, or the fitness or unfitness of this or that man to fill the Presidential chair. A Federal warrant must be obtained before one feels himself authorized to support a measure of State policy; and the merits or demerits of any given measure will be determined by the fact, that it is or is not opposed by the Federal administration. Federal politics therefore decide everything, and reduce State politics to insignificance.

Is this the order of things demanded by the genius of our institutions? Does this comport with the Divine Idea with which our fathers were inspired? Was the Federal government framed to be the supreme government, and intended to invade by its acts even our domestic fire-sides? Does the theory of our institutions make the State governments mere prefectures, dependent on and accountable to the Federal government? Most assuredly not. Widely then have we departed from that theory, and fearfully rapid has been our progress towards centralization, which is only another name for despotism. Without delay, then, should we hasten to retrace our steps, and return to the special purposes for which the government was instituted, and beyond which it should never have strayed.

The people are honest, and they mean to preserve their democratic institutions. They never would have suffered this departure from first principles, had

they clearly perceived the precise nature of the Federal government. Our system of government, though exceedingly simple, has nevertheless the appearance of being exceedingly complex. Foreigners rarely if ever comprehend its real character. They regard the Federal government as the supreme government, the State governments as inferior and subordinate. Their view of it presupposes the Federal government to have possessed in the outset all the powers of government, and to retain in its possession now all not conceded to the States. Many of our own citizens seem to fall into the same error. They appear to regard the constitution of the United States as a limitation, rather than as an enumeration, of the powers of the Federal government. They seem to forget that the sovereignty exercised by the Federal government is after all vested in the States, and is exercised by the Federal government, only because the States have by mutual compact agreed that that portion of their sovereignty shall be so exercised. They have therefore felt that the Federal government, instead of being at liberty to do only what it has the express leave to do, is at liberty to do whatever it is not forbidden to do; that where it has not the power to act directly, it may act indirectly; and while in the pursuit of a constitutional end, it may accomplish, incidentally, any object it can, providing that object promises to be of general utility. They have therefore been able to see, without alarm, the government touching more interests and exerting almost infinitely greater control incidentally, than it can directly, in the plain, straight-forward exercise of its constitutional powers. They have also, in consequence of adopting this principle of interpretation, been able to solicit, without compunction, a continual extension of this incidental action, and to allege pretexts for so extending it, as to bring it home to every man's "bosom and business." Had they clearly perceived the true character of the Federal government, they had not seen this without lively alarm, nor done it without poignant remorse.

In consequence of adopting the rule, that the government may do incidentally what it may not do directly, and what is not necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions, three systems of policy have grown up, which not only create obstacles to a return of the government to its legitimate province, but also perpetual inducements for it to depart further and still further from it. These are the system of Internal Improvements, the American System, as it is called, and the connexion of the government with Banking. There is no constitutional grant of power to the Federal government, in favor of any one of these. Congress has the right to establish post offices and post roads, and to provide for the general welfare; therefore it has been contended that it may intersect the whole country with great roads, and undertake any work of internal improvement that promises to be generally useful. It has no right to lay a protective tariff, but inasmuch as it has the right to lay imposts for the purposes of revenue, it may lay them to double the amount needed for revenue, and so lay them as to tax one portion of the community to enhance the profits of another, and in point of fact so as to affect all the business relations of the whole country. Under the grant of power to regulate commerce, to coin money and fix the value thereof, it is contended that it has the right to be connected with the banks and the whole business of banking. By means of its connexion with the banks and banking business, it is brought into the closest connexion with every man, woman, and child in these twenty-six confederated States. We say nothing against banks or the banking system. We are not now inquiring whether the system be a good or a bad one. What we are contending for stands above and independent on any views, anybody may entertain of banks or banking. The banks are intimately connected with all the business concerns of the community; they affect the private fortune of every individual; they determine, to a great extent at least, the price of every article bought

or sold, produced or consumed. The government, by being connected with them, becomes connected with the business concerns of every individual citizen, and controls those concerns, just in proportion as it is connected with the banks or exerts a controlling influence over their operations.

By means of the Internal Improvement system, of the American system, and its connexion with banks, the Federal government has become the supreme government of the land. We say *has* become, perhaps it were as well to say, *had* become. The tendency to centralization was unchecked till the accession of General Jackson to the presidency. During his administration it began to be arrested. Some may indeed question this fact, and we will not insist on it so far as concerns the executive department of the Federal government. Circumstances, not sought by General Jackson, and which we see not well how he could have controlled, threw into the hands of the Executive an uncommon share of power, and gave to administrative measures an influence and an importance, which we hope never to see possessed by the measures of any subsequent administration. Nevertheless, the tendency,—excepting always a certain proclamation,—so far as the doctrines promulgated, and measures recommended were concerned,—was arrested. The Internal Improvement system was vetoed, the American system was modified, compromised, and sent on its way to the place whence it came. And now, if we mean to finish the work, and arrest completely and perhaps forever, this dangerous tendency, we must disconnect the government from all banks and bank agency, and adopt the principle of the Sub-Treasury Bill.

Now, as we have taken it for granted that nobody amongst us is for changing the fundamental laws of our institutions, or for disturbing the relations which our fathers saw fit to establish between the Federal government and the State governments, we see not well how any man can avoid coming to the above con-

clusion. There are only two courses for us to take. One course is to make the Federal government, by its connexion with the banking business, and through that with private credit, which is, in this country, the basis of most business transactions, the supreme government, the government controlling all the State governments, and the one which most vitally affects the people. We can take this course if we will. Revive the Deposit system, or charter a National bank, and we shall have taken it. But then our institutions are radically changed; the wisdom of our fathers set at naught; and we ourselves afloat on the tide of a new experiment. We trust that we are, as a people, yet too near the cradle of our institutions, and that we yet feel too much of the joy that thrilled our hearts, when we were told the young child, Liberty, was born, to be prepared for this. We trust also that we have too much stability of character, firmness of purpose, and self respect, to disappoint at once the hopes of the friends of freedom throughout the world, who have been looking to us for encouragement, and for a triumphant answer to those who allege that society cannot subsist without Kings, Hierarchies, and Nobilities.

The other course is to adopt the principle of the Sub-Treasury Bill, and divorce the government from its destructive alliance with the business of banking. It is to follow out the policy already commenced; and as we have abandoned the Internal Improvement system, and the Protective system, so now to abandon the Banking system. We mean not by this that the government is to wage a war against the banks, but that it shall let them alone. If the States have not yielded up to the general government their right to institute banks, the banks are matters wholly within the jurisdiction of the States, and we should be the first to repel any attacks the Federal government might be disposed to make on them; and this too whether we approved the banking system or not. The States are competent to manage their own affairs. We ask

nothing of the Federal government in relation to banks, but to provide for the management of its fiscal concerns, without making any use, directly or indirectly, of their agency.

The adoption of this principle will be for the Federal government to withdraw itself within its legitimate province, from which we can see nothing, very soon at least, likely to tempt it forth again. This will leave a broader field and weightier matters to the State governments, which will raise their importance in the estimation of the people, make them objects of more serious attention, enlist more talent in their administration, and make them altogether more practically useful. We have no wish to underrate the Federal government. If the tendency of the times were to lessen its importance, we would set forth its claims in as strong terms as we do now those of the States. Because we value the rights of the States, it must not be inferred that we do not value the Union. The Union is by no means likely in our days to be under-estimated. The centripetal force is altogether too strong for that. Should we, however, see the centrifugal force predominating, and be led to apprehend any danger from a tendency to individuality, to disunion, dissolution, we trust we should be found among the fast friends of the Union. But we are not one of those who neglect the danger which now is, to utter warnings against a danger, which may possibly never come. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. The Federal government is indispensable, and in its sphere, it should be preserved at all hazards. But it is after all less essential than our State governments. Our external relations, our affairs as communities, which it belongs to the Federal government to watch over and regulate, are of far less consequence than our relations as individual citizens. The former are few, and comparatively remote, while the latter are many and intimate. The first affect us only occasionally, the last continually, every moment. The Federal government is also so far removed from the individual citi-

zen, and permits so few to take part in its deliberations or administration, that it can never legislate for private interests, wisely, usefully, and safely, even if it have the constitutional right to do it. The States are therefore the more important institutions of the two. They should therefore claim our first attention. If the principle of the Bill under consideration be adopted, they will receive our first attention. Political men will not be thinking perpetually then of what may be thought at Washington. They will have leisure to bestow their best thoughts on State legislation, on the means of removing abuses which weigh heavily on the individual citizen, of improving our systems of jurisprudence, increasing the facilities for popular education, encouraging literature and the arts, and elevating the individual man. The balance between the State and the individual, between the Federal government and the State governments, may be readjusted, and we be at liberty to develop the resources of our noble country, to avail ourselves of our commanding position, and to prove ourselves a people worthy to be studied and imitated.

The principle of this Bill ought also to be adopted, because it simplifies the fiscal concerns of the nation, and keeps them clear of the complicated financial systems of the Old World. The real governments of the Old World are at this moment on 'Change or the Bourse, and the regulation of funds is the principal business of government. Government, instituted for the social weal of the people, becomes thus the mere instrument of private interest, of stock-jobbers, speculators in the funds. We do not want this state of things here. We want a government, simple, open, and direct in its action, performing in the simplest and plainest manner possible the functions assigned to it.

We have also commenced in this country a new system of government, not in form only, but in spirit. We reject the maxim, that it is necessary to deceive the people for the people's good, and adopt the maxim,

that honesty is the best policy. To carry out this maxim, it is necessary that the government should always tell the truth, both in its words and its deeds. It has a right to impose taxes, but only for defraying the expenses incurred in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional powers. It may lay imposts and collect revenues, for this purpose, and for this purpose only. It has then no right to use its revenues, or to suffer them to be used, for any other purpose. Now, when it deposits its revenues in the banks, whether in a National bank or in a State bank, in general deposite, as it is contended it should, it uses its revenues, or suffers them to be used, for other purposes than those of defraying its expenses. They are not deposited there for safe keeping, as the people are taught to believe, but to be made the basis of loans to the business part of the community. They serve the purpose of sustaining the credit of the banks and, through the banks, of the merchants and manufacturers. This is to collect the revenues for one purpose, and to appropriate them to another. This is to deceive the people, and to depart from the fundamental maxim of our state policy. If it be necessary to tax the community some thirty millions of dollars annually, to sustain the credit of business men, and to enable them to carry on their extensive operations, let them be so taxed ; but let it be openly and avowedly. The people will know then what they are taxed for. But so long as the revenues are avowedly collected for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the government, they should be sacred to that end. If in this way a portion of the funds of the nation be useless, it may operate as an inducement to make the taxes as light as possible, which in its turn will relieve the people, and keep the government poor ; and by keeping it poor, keep it honest, free from corruption.

The greatest objection, or one of the greatest objections to the Deposit system, in either a National bank or in State banks, is that it gives to the banks the use of the government funds. Being given to the

banks, the use of these funds is virtually given to the business community. The business community, so long as it has the use of them, will not be anxious to reduce the revenues. It will prefer high taxes, and favor the accumulation of a surplus, because by having the use of the funds to sustain its credit, it gets back more than it is obliged to pay in taxes. This part of the subject, Mr. Calhoun, in his speech of February 15th, has set in a clear light, and his remarks deserve to be read and pondered well by every freeman. The policy of our government should be to make the taxes as light as possible, consequently to look with distrust on all measures the direct tendency of which must be to increase them.

It may also be maintained, with some plausibility at least, that it is for the true interest of the banks themselves to have no connexion with the fiscal concerns of the government. Nobody, we presume, is hardy enough to contend that the banks should control the government. It has never, we believe, been the intention of the people to place the real government of the country in the hands of bank corporations. They have, we believe, always intended that the government should maintain its supremacy, and follow its own interest and that of the country, regardless of the special interests of the presidents and directors of banks. In case the government maintains its supremacy, the amount of its funds, the time, place, and extent of its appropriations, must always be matters beyond the control of the banks, and also matters which they may not always foresee or be prepared to meet. Government will have it in its power to disturb, whenever it chooses, their nicest business calculations, and thwart them in their most cherished plans. It may call upon them for its funds, when they are all loaned out, and when they cannot be called in without great detriment to the business operations of the community, often not without producing a panic, financial embarrassment, commercial distress. If there be but one bank, or if

there be one mammoth bank, it may, perhaps, profit by panics, financial embarrassments, commercial distress, but the banks generally cannot. Their interest is one and the same with that of the business community; it is best promoted by sustaining credit, by keeping the waters smooth and even, the times good and easy. They ought, then, to be free from all connexion with a partner over whose operations they have no control, and who may choose to withdraw his investments at the very moment when they are most in need of them. It is altogether better for them to trust to their own means, and keep to their proper vocation, than it is to mix up their interests with those of the government. The history of the late Deposit banks may be thought to afford some evidence of the truth of this.

We did intend to adduce several other considerations in favor of the Sub-Treasury Bill, but our limits forbid. We have barely room left to offer a few brief remarks on the principal objections we have heard urged against it.

The Bill is said by some to be objectionable, because in its original form, it contemplates the disuse of bank notes in payment of the public dues. But this is essential to the principle of the Bill. It is impossible to separate the government from the business of banking, so long as it receives or pays out bank notes. There is no difference in principle between receiving a bank note, and making a bank deposit. A bank note is merely a certificate of deposit in the bank in favor of its holder, to its nominal amount. If the bank be solvent it will be paid on demand, and so will be the deposit made in any other form.

Then again, why should the government receive the notes of banks rather than of individuals? Bank notes are not money, — currency. Their value consists in the confidence entertained by the community, that their promises to pay money will be redeemed on demand. Notes of individuals may be as likely to be redeemed as these bank notes, may be worth as much,

and be in as good credit; why not take them? Why demand payment of the revenues at all? Why not take the notes or bonds of the government debtors, as sufficient? The principle would be the same with that of taking bank notes. What would the people think of a provision for receiving the notes of certain individual merchants or manufacturers in payment of the public dues?

Bank notes, we have said, are not currency. Currency is that which passes current in the legal discharge of debts. In no case, except that of the government, are bank notes ever made a legal tender. No creditor but the government is under any obligation to receive them. Why shall the government be compelled to receive them? Why may not the government, as a creditor, be placed on an equal footing with any other creditor?

Bank notes are no doubt convenient and highly useful in commercial transactions. A change in the source and method of their emission, together with additional securities for their redemption, is unquestionably demanded, and must ere long be effected; but no one at all acquainted with the business operations of the commercial world will think of dispensing wholly with their use. But when they have no legal value in the discharge of debts, when they are left for their circulation, so far as the law is concerned, to the free-will and confidence of the community,—they have even then a natural tendency to become superabundant, and to stimulate individual credit beyond what is consistent with its soundness. Should the government receive them in payment of the public dues, it would strengthen this tendency, and greatly aggravate its evil consequences. Bank notes will become sufficiently abundant, and be in as good credit as they deserve, although the government should have nothing to do with them, neither receiving them nor paying them out.

We are also disposed to concur with Mr. Calhoun in the position he has assumed, that the Federal gov-

ernment cannot place its funds in the banks in general deposite without violating an express clause of the Constitution. He contends that when the revenues are collected and deposited in the banks, they are, if ever, in the Treasury. The Constitution says expressly, that "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." The public funds deposited in the banks are drawn from them for other purposes than those of meeting appropriations made by law; they are made by the banks the basis of discounts, and are frequently all loaned out to their customers. Can this be done without violating the Constitution?

If the principle involved in this statement be admitted, it follows as a necessary consequence, that the government cannot receive bank notes in payment of the public dues. In denying the right to make the deposite, we necessarily deny the right to receive the notes. To receive the notes of the banks, since these notes are only certificates of deposits, is only an indirect way of making bank deposits. The right to receive them can then rest only on the right to make the deposits.

Mr. Webster promised to reply to this constitutional objection, but, unhappily, he failed to redeem his promise. He merely proved that the government had been in the habit of receiving bank notes in payment of the public dues,—a fact well known, and admitted by Mr. Calhoun. The fact, that the government has been in the habit of receiving bank notes, does not prove that it has a constitutional right to receive them. In establishing the fact, therefore, Mr. Webster did not establish the right,—the only point he was called upon to establish. As he did not do this, since it was what was essential to be done, we presume he could not. If Mr. Webster could not, who can? We conclude, therefore, that Mr. Calhoun is correct, that the government has no constitutional right to place its funds in the banks in general deposite, nor to receive bank notes in payment of the public

dues ; and consequently the objection to the Bill, we are considering, is not an objection to the Bill itself, but to the Constitution.

Mr. Webster's main objection to the Bill is, that it does not provide for a uniform currency, safe and of equal value throughout the Union. This objection is about as reasonable as would be the objection to a Bill fixing the weight and fineness of the dollar, that it does not fix the length of the yard-stick. The Bill professes simply to provide for collecting, safe-keeping, and disbursing the public revenues, without any recourse to banks or to bank agency. To object to it that it does not effect another object, and one which it does not contemplate, is hardly fair. Is it Mr. Webster's creed, that all governmental measures should be avowedly adopted for one object, but really and intentionally for another and a different object ? If so, he must pardon us ; we cannot, with our present notions of honesty and plain-dealing, consent to embrace it.

Mr. Webster insists upon the obligation of the Federal government to provide for a uniform currency, safe and of equal value throughout the Union. He reiterates this, and dwells upon it with as much earnestness, as if he verily thought he was bringing out a novel and unadmitted theory. But really, in the constitutional sense of the term currency, nobody disputes him. It was unquestionably the intention of the framers of the Constitution, that the Federal government should provide for a currency which should be uniform and of equal value throughout all the States. The Union of the States was desired and effected, principally to facilitate their commercial intercourse with one another and with foreign nations. Commerce craved and effected the Union, made us one people. Without the Union, the States would have been to each other foreign nations, and the commercial transactions between the citizens of one State and those of another would have been subjected to the laws, which govern the trade of our citizens

with the subjects of England, France, or any other foreign nation. This was a thing to be avoided. It was desirable to bind the States together in a closer intimacy than that of foreign States, and to make the business intercourse between the citizens of one State and the citizens of another State, as facile and as safe, as the business intercourse between citizens of the same State.

But this was to be effected only by giving to the Federal government the power to provide for a uniform currency, to "coin money and regulate the value thereof." Had this power over the currency been retained by the States individually, there might have been as many currencies as States. What was coin in one State would have been bullion in relation to another. Coins of the same denomination might have varied in value as you passed from State to State, and there would have been no currency in the Union with which debts could be discharged alike in all the States. To avoid this last result, the States were prohibited from issuing bills of credit, and from making any thing but gold and silver a legal tender. This prohibition was not laid on the States for the purpose of protecting the citizens of the same State against one another, but the citizens of one State against those of another State. The object in view was still a uniform currency. It was to secure to every creditor payment in a currency which would be of equal value in whatever part of the Union he might wish to use it.

Now thus far we contend as earnestly as Mr. Webster, that it is the duty of the Federal government to furnish a uniform currency. We contend that this is one of the chief duties of the government, not merely that it may equalize taxes and provide a uniform currency in which to collect its revenues, as we have heard it suggested by some, but also to provide for the wants of commerce, to facilitate the business intercourse between the citizens of one State and those of another. But we do not find that this im-

plies an obligation on the part of the Federal government to provide a currency of bank paper, which shall be safe and of uniform value throughout the States. We cannot find that the Constitution and laws know any other currency than that of gold and silver; and when we consider the object which led to the prohibition of the States from issuing bills of credit, and from making anything but gold and silver a legal tender, we may safely conclude that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution, that gold and silver alone should constitute the legal currency. Bank notes may circulate, because they are convenient, and because it may be believed that they will be redeemed in specie on demand, as may bills of exchange and the promissory notes of individuals; but however much they may circulate they do not constitute a legal currency. It is always optional with the creditor, whether he will receive them or not. So far as the law is concerned he may always insist on payment in gold and silver. If he consents to take bank notes and discharge his debtor, the law regards it, and treats it as a private contract, bargain, or agreement.

Mr. Webster himself, — when it suits his purpose, — contends that gold and silver constitute the only currency known to the Constitution and laws. The following extract from a speech of his in Congress in 1816, which we find in Mr. Calhoun's speech of March 22, is very clear and satisfactory on this point.

“Mr. WEBSTER first addressed the House. He regretted the manner in which this debate had been commenced, on a detached feature of the bill, and not a question affecting the principle; and expressed his fears that a week or two would be lost in the discussion of this question, to no purpose, inasmuch as it might ultimately end in the rejection of the bill. *He proceeded to reply to the arguments of the advocates of the bill.* It was a mistaken idea, he said, which he had heard uttered on this subject, *that we were about to reform the National currency.* No nation had a better currency, he said, than the United States; there was no nation which had guarded its currency with more care; for the framers of the Con-

stitution, and those who enacted the early statutes on this subject, were *hard money men*; they had felt, and therefore duly *appreciated the evils of a paper medium*; they, therefore, sedulously guarded *the currency of the United States from debasement*. *The legal currency of the United States was gold and silver coin*; this was a subject in regard to which Congress had run into no folly.

“‘What, then,’ he asked, ‘was the present evil? *Having a perfectly sound national currency, and the Government having no power in fact to make anything else current but gold and silver, there had grown up in different States a currency of paper issued by banks, setting out with the promise to pay gold and silver, which they had been wholly unable to redeem: the consequence was, that there was a mass of paper afloat, of perhaps fifty millions, which sustained no immediate relation to the legal currency of the country,—a paper which will not enable any man to pay money he owes to his neighbor, or his debts to the Government. The banks had issued more money than they could redeem, and the evil was severely felt,*’ &c. Mr. Webster declined occupying the time of the House, to prove that there was a depreciation of the paper in circulation: *the legal standard of value was gold and silver*; the relation of paper to it proved its state, and the rate of its depreciation. *Gold and silver currency, he said, was the law of the land at home, and the law of the world abroad; there could, in the present state of the world, be no other currency.*” — pp. 13, 14.

Nevertheless Mr. Webster means a bank currency, when he contends the Federal government is bound to provide a safe and uniform currency of equal value throughout the States. He infers the government is bound to provide this currency not only from its general power over the currency, but also from its special power to regulate commerce. Its general power over the currency extends merely to coining money and regulating its value. The power to regulate commerce, even he in his sober moments can hardly contend, reaches his case. On this point Mr. Calhoun’s reply to him is sufficient.

“The last argument of the Senator, on the question at issue, was drawn from the provision of the Constitution, which gives to Congress the right to regulate commerce, and which he says involves the right and obligation to furnish a sound

circulating medium. The train of his reasoning, as far as I could comprehend it, was, that, without a currency, commerce could not exist, at least to any considerable extent, and, of course, there would be nothing to regulate: and, therefore, unless Congress furnished a currency, its power of regulating commerce would become a mere nullity; and from which he inferred the right and obligation to furnish not only a currency, but a bank currency! Whatever may be said of the soundness of the reasoning, all must admit that his mode of construing the Constitution is very bold and novel. To what would it lead? The same clause, in that instrument, which gives Congress the right to coin money and regulate the value thereof, gives it also the kindred right to fix the standard of weights and measures. They are just as essential to the existence of commerce as the currency itself. The yard and the bushel are not less important in the exchange of commodities, than the dollar and the eagle; and the very train of reasoning which would make it the right and duty of the Government to furnish the one, would make it equally so to furnish the other. Again: commerce cannot exist without ships and other means of transportation. Is the government also bound to furnish them? Nor without articles or commodities to be exchanged, cotton, rice, tobacco, and the various products of agriculture and manufactures. Is it also bound to furnish them? Nor these in turn, without labor; and must that too be furnished? If not, I ask the Senator to make the distinction. Where will he draw the line, and on what principles? Does he not see that, according to this mode of construction, the higher powers granted in the Constitution would carry all the inferior, and that this would become a Government of unlimited powers? Take, for instance, the war power, and apply the same mode of construction to it, and what power would there be that Congress could not exercise, nay, be bound to exercise? Intelligence, morals, wealth, numbers, currency, all are important elements of power, and may become so to the defence of the union and safety of the country; and according to the Senator's reasoning, the Government would have the right and would be in duty bound to take charge of the schools, the pulpits, the industry, the population, as well as the currency of the country; and these would comprehend the entire circle of legislation, and leave the State Governments as useless appendages of the system."—pp. 14, 15.

Mr. Webster contends, that since a paper currency has sprung up in the States under the auspices of

State legislation, which answers in many respects all the purposes of the legal currency, it ought, in order to be uniform, current alike in all parts of the Union, to come under the control of the Federal government. Now, if he be right in this, he must admit that the Federal government has the supreme control over all the banks of the country, the full right to determine the mode and extent of their issues, and the securities they must give the public for the redemption of their notes. A power less unlimited than this will not meet the exigencies of the case. But the Federal government can have this power over only the banks of its own creation. Nobody can be mad enough to contend that it may have this power over State institutions. State institutions for furnishing a paper currency must then be abandoned, and Federal banks alone be tolerated.* If the power supposed be vested in the Federal government, the constitutional right of the States to incorporate banks must be given up. Our State banks are all unconstitutional, and the recent act of the Legislature of the State of New-York, authorizing private banking is unconstitutional also. Will Mr. Webster go this length? Is he aware that the ground he assumes is

* It will not alter the state of the case at all, to say that Congress need not exert this control directly; that it may do it indirectly through the agency of a great National Bank. Granting, what however we much doubt, that a National bank would exert the control over State banks here supposed, Congress has no more right to establish a bank for exerting that control, than it has to exert it immediately, by direct Federal legislation. Nothing is clearer than that a government may not do mediately what it may not do immediately. If it have no right to control State banks by direct legislation, it of course has no right to establish a bank to do it. Consequently if the Federal government is bound to regulate the circulation and value of bank paper, it must have the supreme control over the sources of its emission. It can have this control over no institutions but those of its own creation. Either then the Federal government must, after having done its duty in relation to a gold and silver currency, leave bank issues entirely to the people and the States, or else all State banks, or institutions created by the States to furnish a paper currency, must be given up. We yield Mr. Webster either horn of the dilemma.

incompatible with the constitutionality of the State banks? We believe he is, and notwithstanding his professions of regard for them, that he is very nearly prepared to abolish them. No man has said harder things against them, and we believe his soberest convictions are, that the Federal government only has a right to incorporate a bank. It becomes the friends of State banks to look well to Mr. Webster's arguments for a sound, uniform, national bank paper currency. Just as much power as he claims for the Federal government over the paper currency of the country, just so much does he deny to the States; and as he claims the supreme control for the Federal government, he of course leaves nothing to the State governments.

The Bill under consideration is also accounted objectionable, by some, because it will lock up the money of the country in the government vaults, and keep it from general use. But this can be the case only to a limited extent. It is not the policy of modern governments to hoard money. The true theory of our government is to collect no more money than is wanted for its necessary expenditures. Consequently what is collected must always be immediately disbursed in payment of government creditors, and go again into general circulation. Very little will be kept constantly on hand. Mr. Wright thinks about five millions, Mr. Calhoun, in our judgment more correctly, thinks three millions will be nearer the truth. The Bill will tend if adopted to keep down the taxes or revenues. The business portion of the community, who are now for high taxes, because they have the loan of the government funds, will, when they find they can make no use of them, and derive no advantage from them, exert their whole influence to keep them down to the wants of government, and also to keep the wants of government as few as is compatible with its free and healthy action. In this way altogether more will be gained to the country than will be lost by suffering a few millions of dollars to lie idle in the government vaults.

It is said that the Bill increases the patronage of the government. It adds nine additional clerks to the present list of government agents, and creates four new offices of receivers general. This is not much, not sufficient to alarm a man possessed of any tolerable nerves. As for the power of the government over the public funds, it remains precisely the same under the new arrangement as under the old. The change in this respect is merely taking away the control of the banks over the public money, without increasing that of the government. The objection would be nearer the truth if it read, The Bill diminishes the influence of the banks over the fiscal concerns of the government. Put it in the worst light possible, all that can be said is, the safe-keeping of the government funds is placed in the hands of government officers, instead of the hands of irresponsible bank presidents and directors. Is this a weighty objection?

The money will not, it is said, be safe. All safety is comparative. They who have money must run the risk of losing it. Government vaults may be made as safe as bank vaults, and perhaps there may be government officers, who are as honest, as trustworthy, as the officers and agents of banks, whether State or National. The chances against loss are much greater under the Bill, than under the deposite system, in either of its forms. Under the Bill honesty and ordinary prudence alone will suffice to keep them safe, for they are locked up. Under the deposite system they are loaned out, and it depends on the sagacity and accurate calculations, as well as the honesty, of the bank agents, and on the honesty and ability of the bank debtors, whether they shall be kept safe or not.

These are the principal objections which we have heard urged against the Bill. It is in reality unobjectionable, and the opposition to it does not arise from any conviction that the measure itself will not work well, but from the fact, that it does not give to the business community the use of the government funds,

during the period which elapses between their collection and disbursement. From the organization of the Federal government up to the present moment, the business community, by means of the funding system and bank agency, have had, in a greater or less degree, the use of the public funds, and made them, to a great extent, the basis of their credit and business operations. They have had the use of these funds so long that they seem to have forgotten that they were originally collected, not for them, but for the government. They seem to think that long possession has given them a right to them. And now that the government proposes to reclaim them, and to make them sacred to the uses for which they were collected, they feel themselves sorely grieved, and talk of the government, as though it were doing them a wrong. We hope, however, they will moderate their wrath, and reflect with a little soberness. If they do, we think they must be satisfied that the government is not 'wronging them.

For ourselves, we can see no reason why the business portion of the community should have, directly or indirectly, the use of the government funds. We will charge upon no class of our fellow citizens the doctrine that the government ought to protect, or specially favor one portion of the community, as the means of benefiting other portions of the community. We do not believe that the business men will maintain, in general thesis, that government ought to favor them, facilitate their operations, in order to enable them to advance the interests of the farmer and the artisan. There is, we devoutly hope, nobody among us to contend that the government should hire one class to take care of another. For, here, everybody knows, government can give to one class only what it takes from another. We go against all special protection, against all special favors. We wish well to commerce, well to manufactures, well to agriculture, well to the mechanic arts. These are all sister interests ; and when government does not choose

to single out one as the special object of its caresses, they all live harmoniously together, and add to each other's comfort.

If, however, any interest in this country needs to be protected more than another, it is the interest of what may be termed productive labor. Commerce and manufactures do not need with us any especial care of the government. Of all interests among us they are those which can best take care of themselves. Money always secures the influence needed for its own protection. It is those who come not into the moneyed class, honest, but humble laborers, who are usually deficient in the power to protect themselves. But for these we ask no special protection, no special governmental action. Leave industry free, unshackled, and they will work out their own salvation.

If this Bill become a law, it will, in our judgment, mark a new era in the history of our government. It will greatly diminish the business of the government, lessen the demand for legislation, and leave more to individual freedom, skill, and enterprise. Some inconveniences at first must doubtless be anticipated. It will take some little time for things to settle down, business to find a smooth and safe channel. No important change, however beneficial or desirable, can be effected without more or less of inconvenience and suffering. We gained not our national independence, without inconvenience, without long and painful sacrifices. Yet it is thought now to be worth all it cost us.

If this Bill become a law, we shall have gained, in addition to our political independence, social independence, which is still more valuable. The moneyed interest will be prevented from converting our government from a democracy into a timocracy, and the people, the whole people, will be in fact, not in name only, the state, under justice, the real sovereign. Our Republic will continue its peaceful march of freedom, and realize the Idea of its venerated founders. There is a glorious Future before us. If we only possess

the wisdom to decide rightly the great questions, as they from time to time come up, we shall assuredly realize it. We love to contemplate the destiny which may, and which we trust will be ours; and we could expatiate with no little enthusiasm on it; but we forbear. Whatever may be the fate of the Bill, we despair not of the Republic. The people here are strong; and though they may err for a moment, or for a moment be deceived, they will come round right in the end, and prove that "*vox populi*" is, after all, the surest rendering of "*vox Dei*."

ART. IV. — *The American Democrat, or Hints on the Social and Civic Relations of the United States of America.* By J. FENIMORE COOPER. Cooperstown: H. & E. Phinney. 1838. 12mo. pp. 192.

THE creator of *Natty Leatherstocking* and the author of the *Bravo* can hardly write a book that shall be read without interest, or fail to deserve the respectful consideration of his countrymen. He possesses talents of a high order, is not wholly without genius, and has, in the course of his reading and travels, amassed much useful information. He has contributed something to American literature, and gained a name that will not be forgotten for some time to come.

It would be interesting to ourselves, and perhaps to our readers, were we prepared to do it, to enter into the consideration of Mr. Cooper's merits as a writer, into a critical examination of his works, and some speculations as to their probable influence upon the thought and literature of this country. The thing is to be done, and will be done; but is not for us, at present at least, to do it. His earlier novels amused us; his later productions have done something to quicken our thinking powers, and to instruct us.

We have a high regard for Mr. Cooper, for his love of independence, and his willingness to hazard his literary reputation in the cause of the people. We respect him for the fact, that he had the moral courage to approve and defend some of the measures of General Jackson's administration, and those measures, too, the most assailed by that portion of the community on which literary men are thought to be the more immediately dependent, and with which they are the more intimately connected. We respect him for his rebellion against Cant, for his earnest defence of individual freedom, and his manly assertion of every individual's right to form and express his own opinions, without being called to an account, abused, insulted, injured in his person, feelings, or reputation, for so doing. We respect him because he loves his country, and would make her true to the democratic creed she avows, as independent on foreign nations in her thoughts, as she is in her politics. In these particulars at least, he deserves the gratitude of his countrymen, and we trust he will receive it. He is willing to be known as a democrat, and the literary man, not ashamed to be called a democrat, in this democratic country, deserves to be held in more than ordinary consideration.

The work before us is written with ability, in a clear, strong, and manly style, and handles a subject with great freedom and with much justice, on which American citizens,—shame to say,—need to be instructed. Mr. Cooper thinks he sees two tendencies among us, which are alike dangerous to the stability and beneficial working of our free institutions. The upper classes, the affluent, the fashionable, he thinks are somewhat Anti-American in their thoughts, principles, and affections. They do not accept heartily our free institutions, and set themselves seriously at work to develop the practical good they contain. They imbibe too readily the notions as the fashions of foreign countries, especially of England, and sigh to reproduce an order of things, which can never exist, and

which ought never to exist on this continent. They magnify the evils of the American system of government and society, and laud beyond measure the excellences of the monarchical or aristocratical institutions of the Old World. "Fifteen years since," he says, "all complaints against our institutions were virtually silenced, whereas now it is rare to hear them praised, except by the mass, or by those who wish to profit by the favors of the mass."

The lower classes, or the mass, he thinks, are governed by an opposite tendency, which is pushing them to a dangerous extreme. Notions that are impracticable, and which, if persevered in, cannot fail to produce disorganization, if not revolution, are getting to be widely prevalent; and there is a multitude who are looking ahead in the idle hope of substituting a fancied perfection for the ills of life. This disorganizing tendency in the mass, he thinks, if not arrested, will check civilization, destroy the arts and refinements of civilized life, and reduce us all to a dead level of barbarism. This book, it may therefore be readily conjectured, is a double battery, charged alike against those who believe too much in the past, and those who believe too much in the future. The author aims to demolish those who have too much democracy and those who have too little. To be democratic over much, is ungentlemanly, and may lead to a kind of levelling not agreeable to those who are ambitious of being distinguished, and to be democratic not enough, is unwise, not to say absolutely foolish.

This is, no doubt, to a certain extent, true, and the author's efforts to recall his countrymen from extremes, and to induce them to maintain the golden mean, are, no doubt, praiseworthy; but that they will be successful is not altogether so certain. Men in masses, as well as in their individual capacity, are logicians, and have an irresistible tendency to push their first principles to their last consequences. They can never be arrested by being pointed to the dangerous

extremes into which they are running. Wise, practical observations are useless. The masses go where their principles logically developed require them to go. To arrest them we must change their principles, alter or enlarge their premises. But this is what Mr. Cooper has not done, and what he has not attempted to do. He does not seek for the causes of these opposite tendencies to dangerous extremes, to point out the defects in our first principles, and by changing our logical direction, to change also our practical direction. He does not appear to believe that the practice of a nation is merely its experimenting in verification of its theory, or the mere practical application of its theory. Change the theory, the philosophy of a nation, its ideas, and you change its history. But Mr. Cooper has no faith in theories, no love for the abstract. He affects the character of a wise man, who has seen the world; of a shrewd observer, who is above the speculations of the student, and not at all dependent on closet thinkers. He has seen, and he knows. He is a common sense man, and says, away with your visionary theories, and let us have a little common sense. All this is very well. Common sense is unquestionably a very excellent thing, and Mr. Cooper, no doubt, has it; but if it be *common* sense, we see not why we may not claim it as well as he. We think he ought to pronounce the word with fewer airs, for, if what he calls common sense, really be common sense, it must be common to all men, and he can in no wise claim a monopoly of it.

Again; Mr Cooper, though he abjures all theories, and has many a biting sarcasm at theorizers in general, is himself a theorizer, and that too of no commendable sort. Does he not theorize, when he lays it down as a general proposition, that common sense is worthy of credit? Does he not theorize, when he declares this notion is practicable and that is not? When he tells us this amount of equality may be attained, and this other amount cannot be? He

affects to have analyzed the powers of the human mind, and to have ascertained how much it is wise to aim at, and what it is merely visionary to attempt. And what are his views on these matters, but the theories he has adopted respecting the Desirable and the Undesirable, the Wise and the Foolish, the Attainable and the Unattainable? Has he not speculated in coming to his conclusions? or has he jumped to his conclusions? And is it his theory that all men ought to jump to their conclusions? If so, we say he is a theorizer, whom a wise man may well hesitate to follow. Mr. Cooper does not, we must needs think, prove himself so wise in declaiming against theorizing, which is in fact declaiming against reasoning, reflection, as he fancies; and his common sense, we imagine, may, in many instances, be found to be very uncommon sense, a very peculiar sense, even an idiosyncrasy.

This is not all. The man who is accustomed to analyze the works he reads, and reduce them to their lowest denominations, will, without much difficulty, perceive that Mr. Cooper's common sense rests, in most cases, for its support on the philosophy of Hobbes. We presume he has never read Hobbes, perhaps he has never heard of him, certainly, we presume, is unconscious of ever coinciding with his philosophic theory. But Hobbes's philosophy is, in political matters, the common sense of most Englishmen and Americans; and all Englishmen and Americans, who eschew philosophy and professedly follow common sense, are sure to be Hobbists. Mr. Cooper, we are sorry to say, forms no exception to this remark. For proof of what we allege we refer to his definition of liberty, and to the fact, that he seems to have no faith in abstract justice. Liberty with him is the right to do what one pleases. Perfect liberty, or a state of society, if society it may be called, in which there is no restraint placed on men's natural right, is a state of war, oppression, injustice. Government is instituted for the purpose of maintaining peace and

order, by restraining natural liberty. This is Hobbism, and it is the doctrine of the book before us; only Mr. Cooper thinks we may leave men a larger portion of their natural liberty than Hobbes believed could be done with safety.

Now we contend that the design of government is to maintain to every man all his natural liberty. Liberty, according to our definition of it, is freedom to do whatever one has a natural right to do; and one has a natural right to do whatever is not forbidden by natural or absolute justice. Mr. Cooper admits the right of governments to restrain the natural liberty of the citizen, to a certain extent, but we admit no such right. The government that restrains or abridges in any sense, in any degree, the natural liberty, that is the natural rights, of any, the meanest or the guiltiest citizen, is tyrannical and unjust. In checking the tendency to extremes then, which Mr. Cooper deplores and against which he arms himself with so praiseworthy a zeal, we should endeavor to point out the precise limits prescribed by justice. We should deny the justice of all restraints upon natural rights. We should then check at once the tendency to arbitrary government. Mr. Cooper, however, permits restraint to a certain extent. Why not to a greater extent? say his fashionable, affluent, and polite acquaintances. Why to so great an extent? Why not give more liberty yet? say the visionary mass, in pursuit of an ideal perfection never to be realized. What can he answer? Nothing that will satisfy either, because the question is in both cases, not a question of principle, but merely a question of more or less. This book, therefore, we think, will hardly succeed in arresting the tendency to extremes, because it leaves both parties their starting-points, and with their faces in the same direction, and merely beseeches them not to go quite so far as they have hitherto been disposed to go.

But notwithstanding our want of faith in the great influence of this book in accomplishing the object for

which it has been sent forth, and notwithstanding our objections to its want of faith in reasoning, and to the Hobbian philosophy which lies at the bottom of the author's common sense, we still welcome the book as a very timely and a very valuable publication. It is full of wise and just observations; it is in most cases characterized by good sense, and its views, on all the great political topics it treats, are in the main just and democratic. It corrects many false notions, separates numerous matters which had become confounded, and gives much useful information, for the want of which our citizens have suffered, and our free institutions been endangered. We have more faith in the masses and more sympathy with them than Mr. Cooper appears to have; and we have altogether a stronger love for progress. He seems to be a little sour, half mad at mankind, and to do little for their cause, because he loves it. He too often confounds the actual with the possible, and mistakes what is for what ought to be. But his book breathes in the main a free and independent spirit, and may be said to be written in the interests of the people. It preaches democracy, not exactly according to our reading, nevertheless it preaches it; and if, as we have heard it contended, as much through spite as through love, we complain not. We are thankful that democracy is preached, though it be through spite, through ill-will to the aristocracy.

The following chapter on an Aristocrat and a Democrat, gives a very good idea of the whole work, at least of the spirit in which it is written.

“AN ARISTOCRAT AND A DEMOCRAT.

“We live in an age, when the words aristocrat and democrat are much used, without regard to the real significations. An aristocrat is one of a few, who possess the political power of a country; a democrat, one of the many. The words are also properly applied to those who entertain notions favorable to aristocratical, or democratical forms of government. Such persons are not, necessarily, either aristocrats, or democrats in fact, but merely so in opinion. Thus a member of a

democratical government may have an aristocratical bias, and *vice versa*.

“To call a man who has the habits and opinions of a gentleman, an aristocrat, from that fact alone, is an abuse of terms, and betrays ignorance of the true principles of government, as well as of the world. It must be an equivocal freedom, under which every one is not the master of his own innocent acts and associations, and he is a sneaking democrat, indeed, who will submit to be dictated to, in those habits over which neither law nor morality assumes a right of control.

“Some men fancy that a democrat can only be one who seeks the level, social, mental, and moral, of the majority, a rule that would at once exclude all men of refinement, education, and taste from the class. These persons are enemies of democracy, as they at once render it impracticable. They are usually great sticklers for their own associations and habits, too, though unable to comprehend any of a nature that are superior. They are, in truth, aristocrats in principle, though assuming a contrary pretension; the ground work of all their feelings and arguments being self. Such is not the intention of liberty, whose aim is to leave every man to be the master of his own acts; denying hereditary honors, it is true, as unjust and unnecessary, but not denying the inevitable consequences of civilization.

“The law of God is the only rule of conduct, in this, as in other matters. Each man should do as he would be done by. Were the question put to the greatest advocate of indiscriminate association, whether he would submit to have his company and habits dictated to him, he would be one of the first to resist the tyranny; for they, who are the most rigid in maintaining their own claims, in such matters, are usually the loudest in decrying those whom they fancy to be better off than themselves. Indeed, it may be taken as a rule in social intercourse, that he who is the most apt to question the pretensions of others, is the most conscious of the doubtful position he himself occupies; thus establishing the very claims he affects to deny, by letting his jealousy of it be seen. Manners, education, and refinement, are positive things, and they bring with them innocent tastes, which are productive of high enjoyments; and it is as unjust to deny their possessors their indulgence, as it would be to insist on the less fortunate's passing the time they would rather devote to athletic amusements, in listening to operas for which they have no relish, sung in a language they do not understand.

“All that democracy means is as equal a participation in

rights as is practicable ; and to pretend that social equality is a condition of popular institutions, is to assume that the latter are destructive of civilization ; for, as nothing is more self-evident than the impossibility of raising all men to the highest standard of tastes and refinement, the alternative would be to reduce the entire community to the lowest. The whole embarrassment on this point exists in the difficulty of making men comprehend qualities they do not themselves possess. We can all perceive the difference between ourselves and our inferiors ; but when it comes to a question of the difference between us and our superiors, we fail to appreciate merits of which we have no proper conceptions. In face of this obvious difficulty, there is the safe and just governing rule, already mentioned, or that of permitting every one to be the undisturbed judge of his own habits and associations, so long as they are innocent, and do not impair the rights of others to be equally judges for themselves. It follows, that social intercourse must regulate itself, independently of institutions, with the exception that the latter, while they withhold no natural, bestow no factitious advantages beyond those which are inseparable from the rights of property, and general civilization.

“ In a democracy, men are just as free to aim at the highest attainable places in society, as to obtain the largest fortunes ; and it would be clearly unworthy of all noble sentiment to say, that the grovelling competition for money shall alone be free, while that, which enlists all the liberal acquirements and elevated sentiments of the race, is denied the democrat. Such an avowal would be at once, a declaration of the inferiority of the system, since nothing but ignorance and vulgarity could be its fruits.

“ The democratic gentleman must differ in many essential particulars from the aristocratical gentleman, though in their ordinary habits and tastes they are virtually indetical. Their principles vary ; and, to a slight degree, their deportment accordingly. The democrat, recognising the right of all to participate in power, will be more liberal in his general sentiments, a quality of superiority in itself ; but, in conceding this much to his fellow man, he will proudly maintain his own independence of vulgar domination, as indispensable to his personal habits. The same principles and manliness that would induce him to depose a royal despot, would induce him to resist a vulgar tyrant.

“ There is no more capital, though more common error, than to suppose him an aristocrat who maintains his indepen-

dence of habits; for democracy asserts the control of the majority, only, in matters of law, and not in matters of custom. The very object of the institution is the utmost practicable personal liberty, and to affirm the contrary would be sacrificing the end to the means.

"An aristocrat, therefore, is merely one who fortifies his exclusive privileges by positive institutions, and a democrat, one who is willing to admit of a free competition, in all things. To say, however, that the last supposes this competition will lead to nothing, is an assumption that means are employed without any reference to an end. He is the purest democrat who best maintains his rights, and no rights can be dearer to a man of cultivation, than exemptions from unseasonable invasions on his time, by the coarse-minded and ignorant." — pp. 94–98.

Great men are rarely above taking notice of small things. Mr. Cooper forms no exception to this remark, and small things at his touch become matters of considerable magnitude.

"Some changes of the language are to be regretted, as they lead to false inferences, and society is always a loser by mistaking names for things. Life is a fact, and it is seldom any good arises from a misapprehension of the real circumstances under which we exist. The word 'gentleman' has a positive and limited signification. It means one elevated above the mass of society by his birth, manners, attainments, character, and social condition. As no civilized society can exist without these social differences, nothing is gained by denying the use of the term. If blackguards were to be *called* 'gentlemen,' and 'gentlemen,' 'blackguards,' the difference between them would be as obvious as it is to-day.

"The word 'gentleman,' is derived from the French *gentilhomme*, which originally signified one of noble birth. This was at a time when the characteristics of the condition were never found beyond a caste. As society advanced, ordinary men attained the qualifications of nobility, without that of birth, and the meaning of the word was extended. It is now possible to be a gentleman without birth, though, even in America, where such distinctions are purely conditional, they who have birth, except in extraordinary instances, are classed with gentlemen. To call a laborer, one who has neither education, manners, accomplishments, tastes, associations, nor any one of the ordinary requisites, a gentleman, is just as absurd as to

call one who is thus qualified, a fellow. The word must have some especial signification, or it would be synonymous with man. One may have gentleman-like feelings, principles, and appearance, without possessing the liberal attainments that distinguish the gentleman. Least of all does money make a gentleman, though, as it becomes a means of obtaining the other requisites, it is usual to give it a place in the claims of the class. Men may be, and often are, very rich, without having the smallest title to be deemed gentlemen. A man may be a distinguished gentleman, and not possess as much money as his own footman.

"This word, however, is sometimes used instead of the old terms, 'sirs,' 'my masters,' &c., &c., as in addressing bodies of men. Thus we say 'gentlemen,' in addressing a public meeting, in complaisance, and as, by possibility, some gentlemen may be present. This is a license that may be tolerated, though he who should insist that all present were, as individuals, gentlemen, would hardly escape ridicule.

"What has just been said of the word gentleman is equally true with that of lady. The standard of these two classes rises as society becomes more civilized and refined; the man who might pass for a gentleman in one nation, or community, not being able to maintain the same position in another.

"The inefficiency of the effort to subvert things by names, is shown in the fact that, in all civilized communities, there is a class of men, who silently and quietly recognise each other, as gentlemen; who associate together freely and without reserve, and who admit each other's claims without scruple or distrust. This class may be limited by prejudice and arbitrary enactments, as in Europe, or it may have no other rules than those of taste, sentiment, and the silent laws of usage, as in America.

"The same observations may be made of relation to the words master and servant. He who employs laborers, with the right to command, is a master, and he who lets himself to work, with an obligation to obey, a servant. Thus there are house, or domestic servants, farm servants, shop servants, and various other servants; the term master being in all these cases the correlative.

"In consequence of the domestic servants of America having once been negro-slaves, a prejudice has arisen among the laboring classes of the whites, who not only dislike the term servant, but have also rejected that of master. So far has this prejudice gone, that in lieu of the latter, they have resorted to the use of the word *boss*, which has precisely the same

meaning in Dutch! How far a subterfuge of this nature is worthy of a manly and common sense people will admit of question.

“A similar objection may be made to the use of the word ‘help,’ which is not only an innovation on a just and established term, but which does not properly convey the meaning intended. They who aid their masters in the toil may be deemed ‘helps,’ but they who perform all the labor do not assist, or help to do the thing, but they do it themselves. A man does not usually hire his cook to *help* him cook his dinner, but to cook it herself. Nothing is therefore gained, while something is lost in simplicity and clearness by the substitution of new and imperfect terms, for the long established words of the language. In all cases in which the people of America have retained the *things* of their ancestors, they should not be ashamed to keep the *names*.” — pp. 120 – 122.

It is devoutly to be hoped that all this, and much more like it in the volume before us, will be duly regarded by our democratic friends. It is very important that our democrats should be taught good manners, and probably no man amongst us is better qualified to be their teacher than Mr. Cooper. He has resided long abroad, travelled much, seen much, observed much, and is himself, we presume, *au fait* in all that appertains to good manners. We hope he will meet with success, proportioned to the zeal and diligence with which he takes himself to his task. An unmannerly democracy must always be distasteful and even revolting to a *gentleman*. In sober earnest, he who improves the manners of a nation, does much for its morals. Let there be care, however, that the improvement attempted be something more than the transplanting of the conventionalisms of one country to another. “The wise are polite the world over; fools are polite only at home,” says, very truly, the Citizen of the World. True politeness is made up of good sense and good nature, and no man, who has good sense and good nature, can ever be wanting in the manners of the gentleman, in the only worthy sense of the term, though he may be wanting in the conventionalisms of different countries, or of a par-

ticular clique or coterie. Really good manners always have their foundation in human nature, and must always take their hue from the age and circumstances of the individual, and the institutions of the country. The manners most appropriate to an aristocracy, or to a monarchy, can never be the most appropriate to a democracy. But we beg pardon of Mr. Cooper for trespassing on his peculiar province.

Mr. Cooper thinks the application of the terms *gentleman* and *lady*, to footmen and cooks, is very unbecoming, and ought not to be tolerated. We are sorry not to sympathize with him in this, as fully as he may desire. We applaud his motives, but we confess that we look with pleasure on the fact, that footmen and cooks are rising to the dignity of gentlemen and ladies; and it is also an article in our creed that all who are born at all are well-born. Every human being, in our belief, is of noble, ay, of royal birth, and may stand up and claim to be a king, and demand regal honors. This is the foundation stone of our democracy, and he, who has yet to learn that no human being is or can be ignoble, is in our judgment a sorry democrat.

We confess that as concerns this leveling tendency, we are unable to sympathize with the fears Mr. Cooper seems to indulge. We see no disposition among our countrymen to bring all down to a dead level of ignorance and barbarism. They, against whom the charge of desiring to do this is sometimes brought, are in no sense obnoxious to it. The workingmen, agrarians, loco-focos, jacobins, or by whatever name they may be designated by themselves or by their enemies, have made certain movements which have created some alarm, and made some say that they are for arresting civilization, and for plunging us into primitive ignorance and barbarism; but these same dreaded levellers have been the first in this country to advocate equal, universal education. They demand reforms, radical reforms, it is true; but they expect them almost solely from an improved system of edu-

cation. They propose to raise the standard of education, to breathe into education a free and living spirit, and to extend it equally to all, to every child born in the land, whether rich or poor, male or female. Is this to show a love for ignorance and barbarism? Is this a kind of levelling that should alarm a wise man, a Christian, and a democrat?

Distinctions there are in society, and distinctions there always will be; but distinction implies diversity, not necessarily inequality. The footman is diverse from the cook, but not necessarily inferior or superior to the cook. There is a difference between Mr. Cooper's gentleman and his footman, yet the two may be equal in moral worth, in knowledge, in wealth, and social position. Nevertheless admitting inequalities, they may be real, not factitious. Now all the war which has been carried on against the inequalities which do obtain in society, has had for its object, not the suppression of those inequalities which are founded in nature, or which rest on merit, but those which have no real foundation but an ignorant and barbarous public opinion, or an ignorant and barbarous state of society. Factitious inequalities, not natural, not moral inequalities, are the ones that the Radicals are striving to destroy. Beyond these they have no thought of going. There is in every man, in jacobins as well as in conservatives, a natural instinct which leads him to bow down to superior worth. The great man can never be lost in the crowd. He who is really and intrinsically superior to the common mass will always be permitted to tower above them. Carlyle is right in his remarks on hero-worship. It is the natural and earliest religion of mankind, and it remains and will remain, though all other religions be outgrown, their altars broken down, and their temples mouldered to dust. No man, who is conscious that the royal blood flows in his veins, that the royal heart beats under his ribs, need fear that the honors of royalty will not be decreed him. Let a man be a king, and as a king shall he be owned, revered,

and obeyed. Human nature is rich in loyalty, and will pour out her blood like water in honor of even a semblance of a king. Let the wise man be ashamed then to tremble at a supposed tendency to wipe out all distinctions, and to confound the great with the little.

One tendency we do discover, and that is to strip off disguises and compel people to pass for what they are. There is a growing disgust at all make-believe, at all shamming, and a demand for reality. Therefore is there danger that some men may not always succeed in bearing the characters they once contrived to obtain. The men rather short by nature, but who have hitherto been accounted tall, because they were standing on stilts, may hereafter be taken at their true altitude, and laughed at into the bargain, for the pains they have taken to add a cubit to their stature. Mr. Cooper has nothing to apprehend from such a levelling tendency as this, nor has any other man who is conscious of true worth, and who is willing to be estimated at his real value. Others may fear,—let them.

Mr. Cooper's remarks "On the Public" are to the point, and deserve to be read and pondered well. We should be glad to extract them, but have not the room.

We must bring our remarks to a close, and we do it by throwing out a few suggestions for the consideration of American Democrats. The democracy of the last century was materialism applied to politics; it sought equality by lopping off the heads of kings and priests, and its natural tendency was to universal anarchy. We do not complain of it on this account. Kings and priests, when they have lost the true kingly and priestly nature, have no more right to wear their heads than they have to wear crowns and mitres. But democracy has changed its character. The democrat of to-day is not destructive, but constructive; he does not lop off the heads of kings and priests, but he seeks to arrive at equality by making

every man a king and a priest. He is a leveller, but he levels upward not downward. He is not affected by the fact that some are higher than others, but by the fact that some are lower than others. He grieves over the fact that human nature is wronged, that its inborn nobility is not brought out, that the mass of men are not true men, but something less than men; and he sets himself seriously at work to remove all obstacles to the full development of the true man, and to call forth the might which has for so many ages slumbered in the peasant's arm. He holds up the standard of the True Man, and labors to bring all men up to it. He therefore is eminently religious, eminently christian, eminently philosophic. He avails himself of all the means and influences, of all the arts, sciences, literature, everything, by which the universal soul of Humanity may be quickened, thought awakened, moral power increased, and the majesty of man made to appear. Be assured then that the democrat of to-day is no barbarian. He is a man, a free man, a Christian man, who believes in the powers and capacities of all men to be men, in the full significance of the term, and who labors to make them so, or to induce them to make themselves so.

Again, in a more restricted sphere, the American democrat is one who is jealous of power, and always interprets all doubtful questions so as to increase the power of the people, rather than of the government. In this, his first duty is to watch that the Federal Government do not swallow up the State governments. Power has a perpetual tendency to extend itself. The functionaries of government, whether executive, legislative, or judicial, almost inevitably so exercise their functions as to enlarge the sphere of government. There is a tendency in the Federal Government, from its central character, to engross as much of the public business of the country as possible. The first danger to our liberty is to be apprehended from this quarter. Cooks may be called ladies, and footmen gentlemen, and still our liberty be tolerably secure;

but when the Federal Government has succeeded in getting under its control, directly or indirectly, nearly all the internal affairs of the States, and is able to make its acts, like the frogs of Egypt, reach to our domestic hearths, and to come up into our sleeping chambers and kneading troughs, we may be assured that the first barriers to a consolidated despotism have been leaped. This was well nigh done. The friends of freedom have made an effort to arrest the dangerous tendency; but whether with success or not time must determine. The universal tendency throughout Christendom to centralization, a tendency accelerated a hundred fold by the "thousand and one" voluntary associations of the day, is somewhat alarming, and should teach our democrats, that this is no time to sleep at their posts, or to expect a victory without a long and obstinate struggle. They must be awake, always prepared for the battle, well armed, and stout of heart.

Lastly, the American Democrat must be on his guard against the tendency of the State governments to enlarge the dominion of the state at the expense of that of the individual. There are two antagonist tendencies at work; one to individual freedom, a tendency we traced in our April number, in our remarks on modern civilization; the other, a tendency to centralization, to the merging of the individual in the state, in the mass. This last is the only dangerous tendency in this country. The philosopher cannot fail to perceive that we have much more to apprehend from our reverence for law than from our disregard of it. Mobs, bad as they are, are not half so threatening to liberty, to the true working of our institutions, as the prosecution of a man for advocating an unpopular doctrine, or as is the prevalence of that modern doctrine of "vested rights," a doctrine, which, if admitted and practised upon, may in time cover all the property of the State with charters, and lock it up forever in close corporations. We are called upon as democrats by every consideration that can touch our

sensibility, arouse our patriotism, or our love of humanity, to contend manfully for individual rights, and resist at the threshold every encroachment of power. We must frown upon every legislative enactment, upon every judicial decision, that restricts the sphere of individual freedom, and especially upon all those huge associations which cover the land, though called moral, religious, benevolent, which tend to swallow up the individual, and are a device of the devil, by which the same control under a free government may be exerted over individual opinion and action, that is exerted over them by despotisms and hierarchies. We must throw around each individual a bulwark of sanctity, and not permit society to break through it, though it were to do the individual an unspeakable good. God leaves man his freedom, and does not control it, though man in abusing it brings damnation to his soul. Let the Divine government be a model of ours. We may not control a man's natural liberty even for the man's good. So long as the individual trespasses upon none of the rights of others, or throws no obstacle in the way of their free and full exercise, government, law, public opinion even, must leave him free to take his own course. In order to secure this end we must breathe a freer spirit into our schools, place men at the head of our colleges and higher seminaries of learning who sympathize with our democratic institutions, demand, will, create, and sustain a truly democratic literature.

ART. V.—*The Mother in her Family; or Sayings and Doings at Rose Hill Cottage.* By the Author of "The Young Wife," &c. Boston: Weeks, Jordan & Co. 1838. 12mo. pp. 391.

THE Author of this volume is a worthy and, we would fain believe, a useful man. He is sincere, earn-

est, and ambitious to do what in him lies for the advancement of his race. He is quite a Reformer, and appears to doubt not that he shall soon be able to recover for mankind the long lost Eden.

According to him, so far as we have been able to collect his theory, the seat of life, thought, and virtue is in the stomach, and the Devil, or soul-destroyer, always makes his appearance in the form of roast beef, pig, mutton, fish, rich sauces, or some savory dish or other, and is to be vanquished only by inducing mankind to feed on apples, mush, cold boiled potatoes, with now and then a dessert of parched corn. Apples are the author's favorite dish for reforming the world, and curing all the ills that flesh and spirit are heirs to. His love for apples seems to be very great, even surpassing the love of women; and we cannot help fancying that should he be admitted into Paradise and find no apples there, it would be no paradise to him. May apples go with him wherever he goes. We too are fond of apples. But as for mush, to be eaten without milk, butter, sugar, or molasses, Yankee dish under the name of Hasty-pudding, and immortalized by the immortal Barlow's song, though it be, we will none of it. Cold boiled potatoes unsalted, and no water even to wash them down, — may the author of the delectable book before us, enjoy the sole monopoly of digesting them!

We have no doubt that many of the ills of life come from indigestion. We certainly would not be ungrateful to the man who labors to give us a good digestion. We moreover do by no means object to a simple diet. A simple diet, and by simple diet we mean one into which little animal food enters, is the most favorable to health, and to enjoyment. But because a man wishes to recommend a simple diet, he need not run mad. The earth is filled with a profusion of good things, suitable for food, and we see no reason why we should reject all of them, save apples, mush, and cold potatoes. The way to preserve health and enjoy life is not to starve oneself to death, or to

compel oneself to feed on the coarsest and least nutritious provender. Why, therefore, may not the advocates of a simple diet speak with moderation, and content themselves with urging such changes only as the good sense of the community will approve?

The author of this book doubtless means well, and so may all those who are laboring with him; but we confess that we are sorry to find them calling themselves Reformers. They almost make a sensible man ashamed to enrol himself among the friends of reform, as the shape and tricks of monkeys do sometimes make us ashamed of our humanity. It is well to be reformers; it is our duty to labor for the progress of our race; but we should do it with a becoming modesty, feeling that it is but dimly we can see the new good to be obtained, and but little that we can do to obtain it. It is an unpleasant sight to a wise man, that of one of our modern reformers astride the millionth part of an idea, cantering away as a Tenth Avator, and fancying that he bears with him the universal palingenesia of Man and Nature.

In fact, are not our modern Reformers carrying the joke a little too far? They are becoming, it strikes us, a real annoyance. The land is overspread with them, and matters have come to such a pass, that a peaceable man can hardly venture to eat or drink, to go to bed or to get up, to correct his children or kiss his wife, without obtaining the permission and the direction of some moral or other reform society. The individual is bound hand and foot, and delivered up to the sage Doctors and sager Doctresses, who have volunteered their services in the management of his affairs. He has nothing he can call his own, not even his will. There is left him no spot, no sanctum, into which some association committee cannot penetrate, and dictate to him what he may do or what he ought to suffer. What is most intimate and sacred in his private relations, is laid before the public, and he is told that he ought to be thankful that there is no dearth of disinterested lecturers, ready in public dis-

courses to explain to his wife all the mysteries of the conception and birth of a human being.

Now this in our judgment is to be philanthropic overmuch. It is making philanthropy altogether too great an annoyance. No real good can come to the community from sacrificing the individual. There are things which an individual ought to be allowed to call his own, and over which he shall have the supreme control. Around each individual there should be traced a circle, within which no stranger should presume or be suffered to enter. It is no service to virtue to keep us all forever in leading-strings. If we are to be men and to show forth the virtues of men, we must be permitted to think and act for ourselves. That philanthropy which proposes to do everything for us, and which will permit us to do nothing of our own accord, may indeed keep us out of harm's way, but it is a left-handed philanthropy, and will be found always to diminish our virtues in the same proportion that it does our vices.

It must joy the heart of every benevolent man to see efforts made for the advancement of Humanity. There is room enough for Reform. But we do wish our modern Reformers would enlarge their conceptions and seek to add knowledge to their zeal. It is well to be zealously affected in a good cause; but zeal in a good cause, if not guided by just knowledge, may work as much evil as good. The world is not to be regenerated by the exertions of reformers who have but one idea, and who fancy that one idea embraces the Universe. Life is a complex affair. The good and the evil it is subject to are so intermixed, and run one so into the other, that it is often no easy matter to say which is which. There is no one sovereign remedy for all the ills of life, no one rule which is applicable at all times to all cases for the production of good. Good and evil both have their source in human nature. The one cannot be greatly increased, or the other essentially diminished, but in proportion as human nature itself is more fully developed; but in

proportion to its general culture and growth. The tree of evil is not destroyed by pruning away a branch here, and a branch there. So long as its root remains in the earth, so long will it live, and flourish. All classes of reformers see and deplore its growth. One class thinks all evils come from the breach of the seventh commandment, another class ascribes them all to the eating of flesh or fish, to the drinking of rum, wine, or cider; this class fancies the world would move on as it should, if women were but allowed equal civil and political rights with men; that class is sure all things will be restored to primitive innocence, love, and harmony, the moment negroes are declared to be no longer slaves; and this other class, when nations shall no longer appeal to arms to decide their disputes. Each of these classes of reformers mounts its hobby and rides away, condemning all as children of the Past, as wedded to old abuses, as the enemies of truth and virtue, who will not do the same. But not one or another of these classes shall succeed. All these classes of evils are mutually connected, and no one of them can be cured separately. The cause of them all lies deep in human nature, as now developed, and they must be regarded as inseparable from the present stage of human progress. The doctors, who are vaunting their skill to cure them, are merely prescribing for the symptoms, not the disease. War is a melancholy thing. Philanthropy cannot but weep over its doings. But as long as the passions of the human heart remain as they are, and the interests of the world continue in their present complicated state, it is perfectly idle to talk of the cessation of war. Everything manly in our nature rises indignant at the bare name of slavery; but should the negroes be declared free, and all other things remain as they were, slavery would not be abolished. One of its forms might be slightly changed, but its substance would continue the same. Give woman equal civil and political rights with man, and if her present tastes and culture remain, her influence will be just what it now

is. Intemperance is not a mother-evil. It is the symptom, not the disease. Temperance lectures will not cure it. It will remain in spite of Temperance Societies, in spite of law, in spite of religion, till the causes producing it are removed, and men are able to find an innocent source of the excitement they crave. Chastity may be commended, but it will not be universal, till the whole community is so trained that it can find more pleasure in sentiment than in sense. The object of each class of reformers is, we are willing to admit, good, and praiseworthy; but it can in no case be insulated and gained as a separate object.

The work of reforming the world is a noble one. The progress of Man and society goes on. But it goes on slowly, much more so than comports with the desires of our one-idea reformers. These reformers, with one idea, are no doubt worth something. Each class of them may contribute something to aid on the work. But no one of them can do much, or run far ahead of the general average of the race. The evils of life rise as lofty mountains in our path. We cannot go over them, nor turn our course around them. They rise alike before all of our race, and form the same barrier to the onward march of all. We must remove them. If we take ourselves to the work with faith and energy, we can remove them. But we can do it only a little by little. Our generation works its brief day at the task, and worn out gives way to another; another comes and removes its portion, and gives way to yet another. Thus do generations labor, and yet centuries elapse before we can perceive that they have made any impression on the mountain. Ever and anon a company may undermine a portion of rock and earth, which come down with thundering noise and raise much dust, and some of the spectators may fancy the work is done. But when the noise has subsided, and the wind has brushed away the dust and smoke, it is seen that many of their number have been crushed under the falling masses, and that fragments have rolled back and blocked up the path which had

already been cleared. There may be something sad and depressing in this view. Life is full of deep pathos to the wise man. Sorrow springs from experience. He, who knew most of man and his trials, was said to be a "man of sorrows and acquainted with grief." Man's path from the cradle to his union with God, is not of smooth and easy ascent, strewn with flowers, and shaded by groves from which the sweet songsters are ever warbling their wild notes. It is steep and rugged, and we ascend not without labor and difficulty. Yet is there no cause for complaint. Man has some strength; let him use it, and not murmur because he has also some weakness. Something he can do; let him do it, and complain not that there is something he cannot do. Each generation has its allotted work; let it take itself cheerfully to its performance. The race is immortal; and as one generation does its work and passes off to receive its reward, a new generation comes on to take up the work where its predecessor left it. The work shall then go on, and the race be ever achieving its destiny. What is it then, though this generation cannot do so much as to leave nothing to its successor?

We have no fellowship with the philosophy, that teaches us to regard with indifference the efforts of a single individual, however puny, to advance the cause of humanity. True philosophy teaches us to find a sufficient reason for whatever occurs, and to see good in everything. We ought therefore never to condemn outright any class of reformers, or plan of reform, we may meet; but we cannot refrain from regarding most of the reformers who fill our age and country as extremely short-sighted, and their plans as most wofully defective. We would not make war upon them, nor in our sober moments treat them otherwise than with great tenderness; but we cannot bring ourselves to act with them. Whoever would pass for a man of correct feelings, and of some degree of philosophic wisdom, must see and deplore the ills that

afflict himself and brethren; he must labor with all his might to cure them; but he will proceed always calmly, with chastened hopes, and with the conviction that the only way to cure many evils is to bear them. The lesson, To Bear, though difficult to learn, and one that many of us never do learn, is one of the lessons most essential to man in his earthly pilgrimage. Even these evils, of which we complain, may be made the ministers of our virtues and the means of our spiritual growth.

The human race makes its way through the centuries, step by step, to its destiny. The evils we now see and feel will one day be removed. But new evils we know not of will doubtless spring up, new mountains arise whose highest peaks are not yet seen in the distant horizon. The lessons of the reformer will be ever repeated, and his trials, labors, sufferings, martyrdom, ever renewed. Well, be it so. The brave spirit will not shrink from the prospect. Life is a struggle. Who would that it should not be? It is from this struggle that Humanity derives her strength, obtains possession of her powers; in it she finds her life; in it she lives; by it she fulfils her destiny. Let us accept it as our heritage, and go forth with strong arms and stout hearts,—and yet not with over sanguine expectations of wonders to be achieved,—to the work that lieth nearest us in time and space, and leave the result to Him in whose hands we and all things are, and with whom it rests to grant or withhold success.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Observations on the Growth of the Mind; with Remarks on some other Subjects. By SAMPSON REED. Boston: Otis Clapp. 1838. 12mo. pp. 192. — This is a valuable little work. Little work, we may call it in its dimensions, but in no other sense. Its author, Mr. Reed, is a profound, and in some respects an original thinker. He has a mind of a high order, and might, if his ambition led him that way, be one of the first metaphysicians of the country. His *Observations on the Growth of the Mind* prove him familiar with the psychological phenomena of human nature, and they deserve to be read by all who are disposed to know themselves.

Mr. Reed is a member of the New (Swedenborgian) Church, — a Church making rather too great pretensions for our taste, but which counts among its members some of the best men our country affords, — men remarkable for their quiet demeanor, and unaffected piety. It is the custom of many to laugh at the New Church, to ridicule its pretensions to frequent intercourse with the Spirit-world; but a Church which can commend itself to such minds as the author of this volume, and many others of the same stamp, must needs make the laughter of those who would laugh at it appear exceedingly sad. We are not prepared to receive all its doctrines; but we confess that we find in the works of Emanuel Swedenborg much sound philosophy, many original and striking views of religion in general, and much just appreciation of Christianity in particular. Swedenborg was too exclusively a mystic for our temper; but we believe the study of his works would do not a little to enlighten Christians of all denominations, and advance the cause of scientific theology and rational piety. We say the same of all the works we have seen of the receivers of his doctrines, and therefore it is we welcome the appearance of this little volume, and commend it to the serious attention of all who are willing to read and think on spiritual subjects.

Emancipation in the West Indies. A Six Months' Tour in Antigua, Barbadoes, and Jamaica, in the year 1837. By JAS. A. THOME, and J. HORACE KIMBALL. New York: 1838. 12mo. pp. 489. — This is a work which can hardly be expected to have any authority out of the ranks of the Abolitionists. Messrs. Thome and Kimball, two red-hot abolitionists as they were, and not over and above stocked with those qualities which are most essential to judicious observers, might indeed write a book which would commend itself to the tastes and judgment of their employers; but they were the last men in the world to be employed to write a book on the West Indies. Men of sober feelings, calm judgment, and in no way previously committed, were the men, that should have been sent out to make observations on the working of Emancipation in those Islands. The book before us we have read attentively; but we judge ourselves as ignorant of the real condition of the Negroes in the West Indies as we were

before. The following, however, are the results which the Abolitionists regard as established by the observations of Messrs. Thome and Kimbal.

- “1. That the act of IMMEDIATE EMANCIPATION in Antigua, was not attended with any disorder whatever.
2. That the emancipated slaves have readily, faithfully, and efficiently worked for wages from the first.
3. That wherever there has been any disturbance in the working of the apprenticeship, it has been invariably by the fault of the masters, or of the officers charged with the execution of the ‘Abolition Act.’
4. That the prejudice of caste is fast disappearing in the emancipated islands.
5. That the apprenticeship was not sought for by the planters as a preparation for freedom.
6. That no such preparation was needed.
7. That the planters, who have fairly made the ‘experiment,’ now greatly prefer the new system to the old.
8. That the emancipated people are perceptibly rising in the scale of civilization, morals, and religion.” — p. vi.

The True Intellectual System of the Universe. By RALPH CUDWORTH, D. D. Andover: Gould & Newman. 1837 and 1838. 2 volumes. 8vo. pp. 804 and 756. — We hold ourselves much obliged to Messrs. Gould and Newman, for giving to the public an American edition of the invaluable works of Dr. Cudworth. It is true we can hardly reconcile it to our feelings to see an old author we learned to reverence in venerable folio, decked out in a modern dandy octavo; nevertheless we are glad to meet Cudworth in any dress in which his publishers may please to send him abroad. We have but to converse a few moments with his profound and eloquent thoughts, to forget whatever concerns his outer man. We hail his republication as a favorable sign of the times, as a proof that there is springing up among us a taste for sound learning, profound erudition, and spiritual philosophy. Cudworth may not deserve to be followed blindly, but the happiest results may be anticipated from a general and careful study of his writings. He belonged to the glorious age of England's history and literature, and we never turn over his pages without being saddened to discover how little the English mind has advanced since the seventeenth century.

The Elements of Political Economy. Abridged for the Use of Academies. By FRANCIS WAYLAND, D. D. Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln. 1837. — We dislike abridgments. We dislike books with strings of questions to each section, whether designed for Academies or not; but aside from these two objections, we like this little volume very well. Dr. Wayland is neither profound nor original as a political economist, but he is clear, condensed, and liberal. In the main we should be disposed to concur with his views, and have no hesitation in commending this abridgment of his work on Political Economy to the principals of our Academies. We wish to say, however, that we are not yet fully convinced of the exceeding value of

the study of this science by our academical students. These students are too young to study it with advantage, and they will do little more than burthen their memories with terms, the meaning of which they will probably never learn. In our colleges it should be studied, of course.

The Sunday School Guide, and Parents' Manual. By A. B. MUZZEY. Boston: James Munroe, & Co. and Benjamin H. Greene. 1838. 18mo. pp. 219. — This is not a very profound work, nor is it in our judgment wholly unexceptionable; nevertheless it contains many good observations and judicious directions. Its great fault, like all the works of its class published among us, is a want of a clear and just perception of what education should be. No man can write a work on education, till he has mastered the philosophy of human nature, and solved the problem of the Destiny of Human Life. Education is the fitting of a man to fulfil his destiny, to attain the end to which his nature destines him. The educator, then, should understand that nature.

Memoir of the Rev. Bernard Whitman. By JASON WHITMAN. Boston: Benjamin H. Greene. 1837. 16mo. pp. 215. — This is a very sensible and well written Memoir of a man well known and highly esteemed among us, cut off in the very midst of his usefulness. Mr. Whitman was a Unitarian, and his mission as such was to popularize Unitarianism. His great object was to gain for it a permanent hold on the heart of the people. This he sought to do by adopting a plain, direct, and earnest manner of address, both in writing and preaching. It is due to him to say that his success was considerable. He contributed his full share in breaking up the exclusive aristocratic character which Unitarianism formerly assumed in this country. If with his democratic manner, he had carried along the democratic doctrines of the Gospel, his success we think would have been greater. It is not a plain dress that wins the masses, but democratic thought. He who would move them must give utterance to ideas that shall be responded to, from the depths of the universal human heart. When Unitarians add to their Rationalism the democracy of the Gospel, they will find their religion popular, and not till then.

The Young House-keeper, or Thoughts on Food and Cookery. By WILLIAM A. ALCOTT. Boston: George W. Light. 1838. 12mo. pp. 424. — This work is by the author of the "Mother in her Family," reviewed in our present number. It is a superior work to that, but of no great merit. Dr. Alcott, we regard as a pure-minded, conscientious man, anxious to benefit the world as much as he can. He is a zealous Reformer, an industrious and most prolific writer. People buy his books, and we suppose read them. For our part, we would rather read his books than eat his cooking.

Vegetable Diet, as sanctioned by Medical men and by experience in all ages. By WILLIAM A. ALCOTT. Boston: Marsh, Capen, and Lyon. 1838. 12mo. pp. 276. — Another of Dr. Alcott's books, and perhaps as good a one as any of his. We hope the good Doctor will stop a while and breathe. If he publishes at the rate he has for the last six weeks, we give him up. No Reviewer in the world will undertake to give even the titles of his books. We solemnly protest, in the name of Letters, against this *extempore* writing, or this written talk, of which Dr. Alcott gives us so many specimens. If a man feels himself moved by the spirit to write a book, let him give to the subject-matter of it his best and ripest reflections; and then let him condense his thoughts into the smallest possible compass. We do not like this way of writing on the gallop, and of giving us fewer thoughts than are needed to serve for milestones. If the book be not worth writing well, it is not worth writing at all.

NOTE. — The term, *genuineness*, would have been more proper than that of *authenticity*, in the article on the Pentateuch, and would have been adopted, had not Dr. Palfrey uniformly used the latter term in his book which is there reviewed. A book may be genuine without being authentic, and vice versa. A genuine book is one written by the author whose name it bears; an authentic book is one whose statements may be regarded as true. Our article can hardly be said to question, in this sense, the *authenticity* of the books of Moses; it merely questions their *genuineness*, that is, the fact that Moses wrote them.

One or two mistakes as to single words, and two or three as to references, may be detected in the article; but they are more vexatious to the writer than to the reader, and are not of sufficient importance to be pointed out.